Intention and the Self
Madden (Rory)
Source: Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, 2011
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate?
  2. I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition.
  3. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity.
    1. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity.
    2. The latter result undercuts a prominent Lockean reply to ‘the thinking animal’1 objection which has recently supplanted traditional Butlerian circularity objections in the personal identity debate.

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