- Which linguistic actions are expressions of self-conscious states of mind? I defend a certain answer to this question.
- Having presented problems for a simple view1 of the connection between first personal states of mind and first person language, and for a slight modification of the view, I go on to distinguish two, more promising, ways of getting a linguistic handle on first person thought.
- These two positions—which I call the Knowledge View and the Intention View— are not explicitly distinguished in the existing literature on the subject.
- My aim is to argue that the Intention View is the superior view. One reason for preferring the Intention View is its capacity to furnish a non-circular route to the identification of first person thoughts. This advantage accrues from the way in which objects of intention contrast with objects of propositional knowledge.
- Another reason for preferring the Intention View is that it diagnoses what is going on in certain persuasive counter-examples to the Knowledge View.
- In the final section of the paper I consider whether the Intention View is subject to some counter-examples of its own. Clarification of the relevant notion of linguistic expression reveals the counter-examples to be merely apparent.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)