Self-Consciousness and its Linguistic Expression
Madden (Rory)
Source: To appear in "Action and Verbal Communication", ed. T. Hung, Springer
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Which linguistic actions are expressions of self-conscious states of mind? I defend a certain answer to this question.
  2. Having presented problems for a simple view1 of the connection between first personal states of mind and first person language, and for a slight modification of the view, I go on to distinguish two, more promising, ways of getting a linguistic handle on first person thought.
  3. These two positions—which I call the Knowledge View and the Intention View— are not explicitly distinguished in the existing literature on the subject.
  4. My aim is to argue that the Intention View is the superior view. One reason for preferring the Intention View is its capacity to furnish a non-circular route to the identification of first person thoughts. This advantage accrues from the way in which objects of intention contrast with objects of propositional knowledge.
  5. Another reason for preferring the Intention View is that it diagnoses what is going on in certain persuasive counter-examples to the Knowledge View.
  6. In the final section of the paper I consider whether the Intention View is subject to some counter-examples of its own. Clarification of the relevant notion of linguistic expression reveals the counter-examples to be merely apparent.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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