Vague Existence Implies Vague Identity
Hershenov (David)
Source: Vague Objects and Vague Identity ed. Ken Akiba and Ali Abasnezhad, Springer. 2014
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer


Author’s Abstract

  1. I take issue with the claim that one can accept de re vague existence without de re vague identity1. Whether we should endorse both is not my main concern here. My thesis is that one can’t have vague existence without vague identity2.
  2. Thus I will show that far more philosophers are implicitly committed by their acceptance of vague existence to vague identity3 than explicitly so committed. But if vague identity4 is impossible, philosophers should reject vague existence as well. And a surprising consequence is that if there is no vague identity5, then the charge of arbitrariness leveled against epistemicism becomes less weighty.
  3. Arguments against vague identity6 (modulo independently reasonable principles) will entail there aren’t vaguely existing entities or even determinately existing objects that indeterminately possess some parts.

Comment:

For the full text, see Hershenov - Vague Existence Implies Vague Identity.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Oct 2020. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page