Vague Existence Implies Vague Identity
Hershenov (David)
Source: Vague Objects and Vague Identity ed. Ken Akiba and Ali Abasnezhad, Springer. 2014
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. I take issue with the claim that one can accept de re vague existence without de re vague identity. Whether we should endorse both is not my main concern here. My thesis is that one can’t have vague existence without vague identity.
  2. Thus I will show that far more philosophers are implicitly committed by their acceptance of vague existence to vague identity than explicitly so committed. But if vague identity is impossible, philosophers should reject vague existence as well. And a surprising consequence is that if there is no vague identity, then the charge of arbitrariness leveled against epistemicism becomes less weighty.
  3. Arguments against vague identity (modulo independently reasonable principles) will entail there aren’t vaguely existing entities or even determinately existing objects that indeterminately possess some parts.

Comment:

For the full text, see Hershenov - Vague Existence Implies Vague Identity.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
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