<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Hershenov (David) - Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?' (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21125.htm">Review of Nancy Murphy's 'Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?'</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/H/Author_Hershenov (David).htm">Hershenov (David)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Religious Studies, 43:2, June 2007, 237-242</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21125.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PapersToNotes_21125.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s Introduction</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Nancey Murphy argues that Christians have nothing to fear from physicalism. We can reject dualism without contradicting biblical accounts of our nature, abandoning belief in our distinctiveness, denying that we are free and responsible, or giving up the hope for an <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>1</SUP>. The benefits are less mystery, more scientific respectability, a spirituality less absorbed with inwardness and otherworldliness, and a greater concern for community. </li><li>As a Christian physicalist I hope that she is right; however, I am not as confident as she that soul theories are in such bad shape or that her favored physicalist account of embodiment, identity across time, and resurrection is free of major problems. </li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_2">Notes</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_2"></A></u><ul type="disc"><li>Hershenov starts by summarising Murphy s sanguine assessment of physicalism from a Christian perspective. <ol type="1"><li>We are  <FONT COLOR = "800080">neither identical to a soul nor have one as a part. </FONT> </li><li> <FONT COLOR = "800080">We are physical bodies, though very complex organic ones. </FONT> </li><li> Soul refers to  <FONT COLOR = "800080">the whole living person</FONT> . </li><li>We are  spirited bodies  where  spirited is  <FONT COLOR = "800080">aspective rather than partive</FONT> &  <FONT COLOR = "800080">  Spirit stands for the whole person in relation to God, not a part of his nature. </FONT> </li></ol></li><li>Murphy s intentions are to keep Christian accounts of human nature  <FONT COLOR = "800080">in keeping with current intellectual developments in the sciences</FONT> . Fine  but a bit of a hostage to fortune. Better, her claim that the NT doesn t intend to teach us anything about human metaphysical compositions, so we re free to follow the truth where it leads. </li><li>Hershenov issues warnings about a couple of Murphy s specific objections to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_3">dualism</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_3"></A>:- <ol type="1"><li><b>Conservation of energy</b>: Hershenov asks whether the mind might influence merely the distribution of energy. Has this been discussed anywhere? It sounds fishy to me  while we might get away without violating the first law of thermodynamics, moving energy about effortlessly violates the second law. </li><li><b>God s intervention at the quantum level</b>: this, apparently,  <FONT COLOR = "800080">doesn t violate statistical laws of physics</FONT> . How so? Hershenov s objection is that the dualist can also use a similar wheeze, but he doesn t spell out how.</li><li><b>How would <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_69.htm">disembodied</A><SUP>4</SUP> souls communicate?</b> If this is an objection to dualism, it s an objection to God and angels communicating, so a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_5">Christian</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_5"></A> can t make use of this objection </li></ol></li><li>Hershenov notes the intended audience  upper undergraduate and graduate students in theology, plus Christian teachers and Church professionals  will find her section on physicalism and free will  especially useful . </li><li>It seems that Murphy has an affinity with Hobbesian spiders as for at free will is concerned.<ol type="1"><li> <FONT COLOR = "800080">& the freedom that we want is just the freedom to act for reasons</FONT> </li><li> <FONT COLOR = "800080">Any more freedom of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_6">libertarian</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_6"></A> bent she thinks is untenable and perhaps even incoherent. </FONT> </li></ol></li><li>So far so good   controversial but plausible , but Hershenov thinks the wheels fall off in the last section of the last chapter (<a name="37"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_13/Abstract_13199.htm">Murphy (Nancey) - What are the philosophical challenges to physicalism? Human distinctiveness, divine action, and personal identity</A>") where personal identity and resurrection are discussed. <ol type="1"><li>She s stopped reading the literature with Wiggins in the early 1970s. </li><li>She doesn t give a clear account of identity, dithering between psychological (memory) and physical (brain) accounts and wanting to add  same moral character to the mix. </li><li>It seems that Murphy wants to have her cake and eat it. She wants us to be living animals, but won t accept the consequences of this and tries to add in a contradictory psychological aspect. </li><li>Hershenov points out that the psychological element would:- <ol type="a"><li>Mean we were never mindless <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryos</A><SUP>7</SUP> or infants.</li><li>Raise problems about what happens to this mindless <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_8">being</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_8"></A> when our psychology develops. </li><li>We couldn t survive severe amnesia, even if re-trained (say, after a stroke). </li><li>Certain <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_9">modal</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_9"></A> claims normally considered true would be false: eg. you couldn t have been brought up a Muslim. </ol> </li><li>So, we ve ended up in something of a muddle. We started off with us being <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>10</SUP>, but Murphy s account ends up with psychological persistence conditions that are inconsistent with this. </li></ol></li><li>Hershenov thinks that Murphy s account of <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_97.htm">resurrection</A><SUP>11</SUP>  where we acquire new bodies  is more akin to <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_95.htm">reincarnation</A><SUP>12</SUP>, and (it seems) is contrary to the Apostles Creed in that the same body isn t restored. There s a long quotation from Murphy is which she states:- <ol type="1"><li>That spatio-temporal continuity  while necessary for the persistence of material objects  is only a contingent part of our concept of a person, since are psychological characteristics are only contingently supported by a material object. </li><li>So (she says) there s no reason why a numerically distinct but qualitatively similar body shouldn t preserve these same characteristics. </li><li>This  recognition allows us to finesse the  <FONT COLOR = "800080">torturous attempts as in the early Church to reconcile resurrection with material continuity. </FONT> </li></ol></li><li>Hershenov wants to know what sort of physical being (which Murphy starts off claiming we are) can switch bodies. In particular  he claims   <FONT COLOR = "800080">No organism, no living being that is essentially <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_13">alive</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_13"></A>, can acquire a new body. </FONT> </li><li>Hershenov now tries to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_14">repair</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_14"></A> Murphy s analysis of human personhood. He can think of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_15">two</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_15"></A> options:- <ol type="1"><li><b>Constitution</b>: this is <a name="40"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A> s Constitution <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">View</A><SUP>16</SUP>. Hershenov s <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_26.htm">rejection</A><SUP>17</SUP> of the <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">CV</A><SUP>18</SUP> is necessarily too <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_19">brief</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_19"></A> in this small space. It comes down to:- <ol type="a"><li>A person is  <FONT COLOR = "800080">derivatively and contingently an animal for it is <em>now</em> constituted by an organic body thought it might not be so in the future , but this isn t enough  since persons are supposed to be a kind of material object and thus should be subsumed under the latter s nature</FONT> . </li><li>As far as it goes, it s OK for our  <FONT COLOR = "800080">possibly not being alive in the next world with a numerically distinct, transformed body where the laws of nature will not hold and thus  we cannot answer in advance questions about digestion, metabolizing and so forth.  </FONT></li><li>Contra Baker s protestations (elsewhere), Hershenov thinks that the <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">CV</A><SUP>20</SUP> involves a commitment to  a new physicalist dualism with two physically indistinguishable material bodies with different properties in the same place at the same time. </li><li>In particular, it falls prey (he says) to the <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">Thinking Animal Argument</A><SUP>21</SUP>. </ol></li><li><b>Identity</b>: we persons are <u>not</u> constituted by  but are identical to  a body that is only contingently alive. <ol type="a"><li>Hershenov thinks there are two ways of unpacking this idea:- <ol type="i"><li><b><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_22">Contingent</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_22"></A> Identity</b>: Now I m identical to one organic body; in the  next <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_23">life</A></U><SUB>23</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_23"></A> I m to be identical to a numerically distinct body. </li><li><b><a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">Phase Sortals</A><SUP>24</SUP></b>: Numerically the same body is at one time alive and at another not so. Hence,  being organic is like  being an adolescent  not an essential property of bodies. </ol></li><li>So, how do these possibilities fit in with Murphy s claims? <ol type="i"><li>Satisfies  a replica of my body could be me ; and  a transformed version of my body could be me .</li><li>Satisfies only the first of the above claims. </ol></li><li>And what are the problems? <ul type="square"><li>Either way, Murphy must abandon her psychological criterion, as the pre-mortem body initially had no psychology.</li><li>She has to posit a disjunctive account of our persistence conditions  either a living body or <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>25</SUP>. </li><li>Hershenov agrees that the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_26">dualism</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_26"></A> of persons and bodies is indeed avoided, but at the cost of either <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_63.htm">contingent identity</A><SUP>27</SUP> or having us as the only animal that s not essentially alive. </li></ul></li><li>Hershenov has an interesting paragraph detailing the additional problems with the  <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_63.htm">contingent identity </A><SUP>28</SUP> interpretation. <ul type="square"><li>There s an  unwarranted leap from organisms admitted ability to survive the replacement of matter to the wholesale replacement of matter by  different stuff in the resurrected replica. </li><li>It is usually taken as a metaphysical necessity that  property instantiations (modes or tropes) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_29">can t</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_29"></A> switch substances . </li><li>Also,  too large or too quick a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_30">replacement</A></U><SUB>30</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_30"></A> results in a duplicate rather than the same substance composed of different matter .</li><li> <FONT COLOR = "800080">Thus new matter must be gradually assimilated to preserve continuity of substance and person preserving property <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_31">instantiations</A></U><SUB>31</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_31"></A>.</FONT> </li><li>Hence, the resurrected <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_32">replica</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_32"></A> is a duplicate rather than the pre-mortem body transformed. </li></ul></ol></li></ol></li><li>Hershenov doesn t think Murphy should adopt either of the above construals of the body/person relationship  either constitution or identity  as neither is required either by physicalism or the need for resurrection. </li><li>Instead, she should drop her claim for our psychological traits being necessary for our persistence and just:- <ol type="1"><li> <FONT COLOR = "800080">trust God to resurrect us in a manner that restores our mind to the manner it was <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_33">last</A></U><SUB>33</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_33"></A> in when in working order. </FONT> </li><li> <FONT COLOR = "800080">if we had died in utero, which seems to have been a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_34">possibility</A></U><SUB>34</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_34"></A>, trust that God would resurrect us and allow us to develop into conscious, moral and loving human beings and introduce us to our family. </FONT> </li></ol></li><li>Murphy  says Hershenov  should also drop the idea that we are only contingently alive, as follows:- <ol type="1"><li> <FONT COLOR = "800080">We don t have to transform our notion of being an animal in order to make sense of how we could possess a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_35">body</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_35"></A> that will serve us without end in the <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>36</SUP>. </li><li>All that is needed is for God to  mask those dispositions of our organic makeup that would otherwise lead to our eventual decay. </li><li>Homeostatic and metabolic functions could be perfectly maintained by the  divine <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_37">doctor</A></U><SUB>37</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_37"></A>. </li><li>Surely this can happen for resurrection is a miracle and eternal life may indeed mean the many of our laws of our world don t <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_38">hold</A></U><SUB>38</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_38"></A>.</FONT> </li></ol></li><li>In summary, Murphy should take us to be  spirited animals, <em>essentially</em> alive , for <ol type="1"><li> <FONT COLOR = "800080">This seems & to be what it is to take embodiment seriously and avoids problems of</FONT>:- <ol type="i"><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">colocation and <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">too many thinkers</A><SUP>39</SUP>, </FONT></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080"><a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_63.htm">contingent identity</A><SUP>40</SUP>, </FONT> </li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080"><a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>41</SUP> with bizarre disjunctive persistence conditions, and </FONT></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">property modes switching bodies. </FONT> </ol></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Such an approach takes our biological nature seriously but </li><li>Doesn t deny that we are <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21125_42">distinct</A></U><SUB>42</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21125_42"></A> from the rest of the animal kingdom in being free, rational and moral creatures that can know God. </FONT> </li></ol> </li></ul><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Review of <a name="41"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2888.htm">Murphy (Nancey) - Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?</A>", </li><li>See <a name="W2685W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~dh25/articles/Murphy%20Book%20Review.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li></ul><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: These aren t intended to be in any way complete. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: Hershenov  despite being a materialist  suggest that dualism may be in better shape than Murphy makes out. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Hershenov says  <FONT COLOR = "800080">presents no new difficulties</FONT> , which is fair enough. </li><li>The question is, should a Christian be worried? </li><li>For all we know, angels are material  they are certainly represented as being able to take human form. </li><li>As, of course, is God. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_6"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: I think this goes along the lines of not just wanting to do what we will, but will what we will. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_8"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>: This is a general problem  much beloved of extreme pro-lifers like Hershenov  with any account of our identity that doesn t insist we come into existence at conception. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_9"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I ve not heard this point before against certain versions of the <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">PV</a>. </li><li>But is this objection correct? <ol type="1"><li>Hershenov claims that the <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TE</a> would violate the transitivity of identity. </li><li>He also claims (correctly) that the child would develop psychologically in very different ways, and that the adults in the two possible worlds would not be psychologically connected. </li><li>But this may just be confusing <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</a> with <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_60.htm">psychological connectedness</a>? </li><li>It s a bit like Reid s  Old Soldier argument against Locke, which also raises issues about the <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_12.htm">logic of identity</a>.</li><li>This is answered by friends of the PV by invoking  <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_897.htm">quasi</a>- psychological attributes, but it s not clear to me what the response is in this case. </li></ol> </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_13"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_13"><B>Footnote 13</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>It is interesting that Hershenov treats "<a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_942.htm">life</a>" as a strictly biological activity of <a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_113.htm">organisms</a>, essentially involving metabolism and the like.</li><li>While I quite like this way of treating  life , it does need to be spelled out clearly. </li><li>It is natural to assume that anything that is not  alive is  dead , but this isn t what Murphy has in mind. She presumably imagines that in the next world the post-mortem individual, while not needing to metabolise, can still function, be conscious, and have all the benefits of  life while not being alive, strictly speaking. </li><li>We need a new term for  non-biological  life  .</li><li>It would apply to God, and the angels  and (maybe) to whatever the <a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_939.htm">transhumanists</a> can dream up. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_14"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_14"><B>Footnote 14</B></A></U>: He says  <FONT COLOR = "800080">construe & the relationship between persons and their animal bodies that might make sense of Murphy s claims</FONT> . <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_15"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_15"><B>Footnote 15</B></A></U>: Which these two are isn t very well signposted. The first is clear, but the second not. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_19"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_19"><B>Footnote 19</B></A></U>: He deals with it at length in <a name="38"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21098.htm">Hershenov (David) - Problems with a Constitution Account of Persons</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_22"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_22"><B>Footnote 22</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>See <a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_63.htm">contingent identity</a>.</li><li>CI usually refers to possible but non-actual situations, but in this case the situation is supposed to be actual. </li><li>It is the case though that under this supposition I m not necessarily identical to this organic body, so  as I am supposed to be currently identical to it  I must be only contingently identical to it. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_23"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_23"><B>Footnote 23</B></A></U>: In what sense of  life is the  next life life?<a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_26"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_26"><B>Footnote 26</B></A></U>: This was the claim  probably false  against the first "<a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">CV</a>" interpretation. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_29"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_29"><B>Footnote 29</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I agree, but this is very  quick , in that it might not be readily apparent what he means by  <FONT COLOR = "800080">property instantiations (modes or tropes) can t switch substances</FONT> .</li><li>A  mode is an enlightenment term for a property of a substance.</li><li>A  trope (at least in metaphysics) is an individuated property. </li><li>So, the thought is that the person  being a property of a substance (the <a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>)  cannot hop from one substance (the human body) to another (the resurrection body), any more than a particular smile or dent could: the numerically-distinct object might be smiling or dented, but it wouldn t be the very same smile or dent. </li><li>But  true though this is  the objection depends on this interpretation of just what a person is. </li><li>A holder of the <a name="32"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">CV</a> wouldn t accept this analysis. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_30"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_30"><B>Footnote 30</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This metabolic assimilation requirement is very reasonable, but may be hard to make precise. </li><li>It also seems to apply to non-metabolising objects  <a name="33"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_52.htm">artifacts</a> for instance. </li><li>But, just what speed of replacement is  too quick or chunking of matter  too large ?</li><li>Presumably both are relative to the  pace of life and size of the organism / object?</li><li>Also, is there any principled reason for all this, apart from an intuition?</li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_31"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_31"><B>Footnote 31</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The last four words of this sentence   <FONT COLOR = "800080">person preserving property instantiations</FONT>  require some exegesis. </li><li>But I m not sure what this should be!</li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_32"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_32"><B>Footnote 32</B></A></U>: The fact that the term  replica is used must mean that Murphy denies any identity-claims for the bodies, and must be adopting a <a name="34"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">constitution view</a> (given that she s a physicalist). <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_33"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_33"><B>Footnote 33</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>All accounts of resurrection are a bit obscure about just what stage of our being is the most appropriate to  restore us to  if this is the right term, or suggestion. </li><li>But at least on this proposal, if the mind just comes along with the body, that s one problem finessed. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_34"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_34"><B>Footnote 34</B></A></U>: Several points here:- <ul type="disc"><li>Firstly, this again reflects Hershenov s ultra-Catholic pro-life stance. Every scrap of human life has eternal value which must be recognised as having a right to achieve fulfilment. </li><li>It is at least consistent, <a name="35"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modally</a> speaking, with the OT:- <ol type="i"><li><b>Job 10:19</b>:  If only I had never come into being, or had been carried straight from the womb to the grave! </li><li><b>Ecclesiastes 6:3</b>:  A man may have a hundred children and live many years; yet no matter how long he lives, if he cannot enjoy his prosperity and does not receive proper burial, I say that a stillborn child is better off than he. </li></ol> </li><li>So, he has Biblical support for the anti-PV approach  though whether the writers really thought that they would be numerically identical to a still birth is uncertain. See Gill:  For though it cannot be said absolutely of such an one, an abortive or untimely birth, that it is a nonentity, or never existed; yet comparatively &  </li><li>However I doubt there s any support for Hershenov s rosy account of post-mortem development from a presumed blank slate.</li><li>Also  as Hershenov s a keen advocate of purgatory (eg. <a name="39"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9531.htm">Hershenov (David) & Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Personal identity and Purgatory</A>")  ought he not to think of limbo as the home for the unbaptised innocent? It seems though that there s no longer clear Catholic teaching on this matter  and that  Limbo of Infants isn t an official doctrine (<a name="W2691W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limbo" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>). </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_35"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_35"><B>Footnote 35</B></A></U>: So, Hershenov thinks that it s this very body. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_37"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_37"><B>Footnote 37</B></A></U>: This would seem to be rather  hands on . It s all pure speculation, of course, but if you go along with this essentially materialist and naturalist approach, you d be better off positing a change in the laws of nature, rather than eternal tinkering (unless you think that s what s already happening). <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_38"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_38"><B>Footnote 38</B></A></U>: Indeed. How could it be otherwise, unless we wanted an eternal mess rather than only a temporary one <a name="On-Page_Link_P21125_42"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21125_42"><B>Footnote 42</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Is this a saltation, or just a matter of degree?</li><li>What would be Hershenov s guide on this matter?</li><li>In particular, is there any <a name="36"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a> motivation for a difference of kind rather than just of degree?</li><li>It is, though, admittedly difficult to know how non-linguistic animals could  know God  even if they might (to a degree) be  free, rational and moral but maybe God has a way. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:10" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:10:28</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>