<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Smith (Barry C.), Broks (Paul), Kennedy (A.L.) & Evans (Jules) - What Does It Mean to Be Me? (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21153.htm">What Does It Mean to Be Me?</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Smith (Barry C.).htm">Smith (Barry C.)</a>, <A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Broks (Paul).htm">Broks (Paul)</a>, <A HREF = "../../Authors/K/Author_Kennedy (A.L.).htm">Kennedy (A.L.)</a> & <A HREF = "../../Authors/E/Author_Evans (Jules).htm">Evans (Jules)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: BBC Website</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21153.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperCitings_21153.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PapersToNotes_21153.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr><p><B>Authors Citing this Paper</B>: <A HREF = "../../Authors/M/Author_Millican (Peter).htm">Millican (Peter)</A></p></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>BBC <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_1">Summaries</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li><b>Introduction</b>: What Does It Mean to Be Me? <a name="W2705W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qfkjm" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <ul type="disc"><li>Each week Melvyn Bragg is joined by four guests with different backgrounds to discuss a really big question. he's asking 'What does it mean to be me?'</li><li>Helping him answer the question are philosopher Barry Smith, neuropsychologist Paul Broks, writer A L Kennedy and philosopher Jules Evans.</li><li>For the rest of the week Jules, Paul, Alison and Barry take us further into the history of ideas about the self with programmes of their own. </li><li>Between them they will:- <ol type="i"><li>Examine Descartes idea 'I think therefore I am', </li><li>Ask what role memory plays in ideas of the self, </li><li>Discover how stories and myths burrow into our unconscious, and </li><li>Ask whether there's more to existentialism than wearing black and pondering deep thoughts. </ol> </li></ul></li><li><b>Talk 1</b>: Paul Broks on John Locke and Personal Identity: <a name="W2706W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qgcgx" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<ul type="disc"><li> Neuropsychologist Paul Broks asks how we can be sure we're the same person as we were yesterday. The philosopher John Locke thought it depended on what we could remember: if we could remember something happening to us, then we were the same person as the person it happened to. But is that true?</li><li>What if our memories could be downloaded and then <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploaded</A><SUP>2</SUP> into another body? Would that new person be the same as us? And if so, how much would we care if the body we now inhabit was destroyed? These sci-fi philosophical <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiments</A><SUP>3</SUP> can make us rethink our concept of personal identity and maybe even our attitudes towards death. In the end, is there really a self at all, or are we just a bundle of mental states and events? </li></ul> </li><li><b>Talk 2</b>: Writer AL Kennedy on Sartre and the Individual: <a name="W2708W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qgm0g" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<ul type="disc"><li>Writer AL Kennedy on Existentialist ideas about the individual. </li><li>Jean Paul Sartre argued that, for humans, 'existence preceded essence'. This means that there is no blueprint or template from which to work - humans are free to make themselves up as they go along. </li><li>Being an individual comes from the way you negotiate this freedom and the choices you make in the face of it. </li></ul> </li><li><b>Talk 3</b>: Philosopher Jules Evans on Jung and the Mind: <a name="W2709W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qjq6k" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<ul type="disc"><li>Philosopher Jules Evans explores Jung and the shadow inside all of us. </li><li>With archive contributions from Carl Jung and Sigmund Freud; plus fantasy writer Juliet McKenna and Mark Vernon, author of <em>Carl Jung: How to Believe</em>. </li></ul> </li><li><b>Talk 4</b>: Philosopher Barry Smith on Descartes and Consciousness: <a name="W2710W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qk1n3" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<ul type="disc"><li>Rene Descartes, one of the most influential philosophers ever, thought the mind was like an open book that could be read by the light of reason. So there was nothing that we could not access or examine in our own minds. </li><li>In fact Descartes argued that consciousness was the mind - there was nothing beyond it. Now we see the mind as a labyrinthine cellar full of bric-a-brac and untapped rooms of which consciousness is merely one - and a small one at that. </li><li>Barry Smith charts this change and explains some of the contemporary thinking about consciousness. </li></ul> </li><li><b>Omnibus</b>: <a name="W2707W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qk6zz" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</li><li><b>Four Brief Animations</b> <ol type="i"><li>Know Thyself: <a name="W2749W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02p1v9x" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>Jean-Paul Sartre and Existential Choice: <a name="W2750W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02s9hqj" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>Erving Goffman and the Performing Self: <a name="W2751W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02p1sqt" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>Descartes   I think, therefore I am : <a name="W2752W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02pdc6n" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </ol> </li></ol> </FONT><BR><u>Notes</u><ol type="1"><li><b>Introductory Seminar</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>After a general introduction by Melvin Bragg, the four contributors give a brief resume of their <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_4">talks-to-be</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_4"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li><b>Barry Smith</b> (<U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_5">Philosopher</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_5"></A>): <ul type="square"><li>His focus will be on the notion of the <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_98.htm">Self</A><SUP>6</SUP>: we are all  terribly aware of ourselves, almost all of the time , so what is it, and what makes it different from everything else in the world? </li><li>Smith s answer is that each of us has an inner life, and a  peculiar access to our own thoughts and feelings. That s what makes me  me .</li><li><a name="44"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/D/Author_Descartes (Rene).htm">Rene Descartes</A> latched on to this inner life as central to the Self, but Smith thinks we need to distinguish between <u>The Self</u> and <u>A Sense of Self</u>, because you can have one without the other. </li><li>Smith says that many have doubted that there s a  continuous enduring unified <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_7">sense</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_7"></A> of me , but at any time you might still have a clear sense of self as the one acting, remembering and the like. </li><li>So, we should start with the inner life and ask what allows us to keep in touch with it. </li></ul></li><li><b>Paul Broks</b> (<U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_8">Neuropsychologist</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_8"></A>): <ul type="square"><li>Is interested in how the <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_55.htm">Brain</A><SUP>9</SUP> relates to the <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1137.htm">Mind</A><SUP>10</SUP>, and how the mind and the brain creates the sense of self. </li><li>We now know a lot about how mental capacities relate to brain systems, but we don t really understand how it all comes together to create a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_11">unified</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_11"></A> sense of self. </li><li>This was <a name="45"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/L/Author_Locke (John).htm">John Locke</A> s problem  he thought that the self was not rooted in a substance but in continuity of consciousness (for him, memory)  it s this that makes us the same thing across a lifetime. </li><li>Bragg asks where s the mind (if it s not the brain)? There s a little altercation between Bragg and Broks  who says we won t find the mind  in there if we open up the skull, but  no brain, no mind . </li><li>However, he adds that the brain  while necessary  might not be sufficient  we might need to live in a society with other minds and brains to construct a sense of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_12">self</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_12"></A>. </li><li>But, if you remove or sufficiently damage the brain then  it s not the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_13">same</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_13"></A> person, or not a person at all . </li></ul></li><li><b>Alison Kennedy</b> (<U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_14">Writer/Poet</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_14"></A>): <ul type="square"><li>Spends a lot of time creating Selves that are not ourselves  fictional characters  what we can  enter into . </li><li>She grew up in a house full of psychologists. At age 6-7 you think you are an unchanging unified whole, but by age 10-12 you re changing and not that unified. </li><li>At university  as  an intellectual  I think therefore I am  if I think more I ll  be more. </li><li>Sartre and  authenticity  if authentic, will be more human than others  terrible motivation for taking up Sartre; wearing black, looking as though pondering deep things all the time. </li><li>On-going, what she s taken from Sartre is the horror that she (might be) a fake  there s no-one there  and subsequently wanting to more fully inhabit the limited time she s got. Anything that doesn t give you that isn t necessarily that helpful. </li></ul></li><li><b>Jules Evans</b> (<U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_15">Philosopher</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_15"></A>): <ul type="square"><li>Is looking at the depth psychology of <a name="46"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/F/Author_Freud (Sigmund).htm">Sigmund Freud</A> and <a name="47"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/J/Author_Jung (Carl).htm">Carl Jung</A> and what they have to say on the Self.</li><li>What we normally consider the Self today  the rational conscious <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_40.htm">ego</A><SUP>16</SUP>  is just a small part of us  an island (in) an ocean of unconsciousness, which is amoral and irrational and  if ignored  will trip us up (Jung s  hobgoblin ), causing us suffering and phobias. </li><li>He had anxiety and post-traumatic stress as a teenager, and came to believe that you can come to terms with this hidden  undiscovered <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_17">country</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_17"></A> through therapy, self-reflection and the arts. </li><li>Modern, rational cognitive therapy has moved on a bit from Freud & Jung, but what he wants to find out is how our unconscious uses myth and symbol (etc.) as ways of organising the unconscious. </li></ul></ol></li><li><b>Melvyn Bragg</b> now steps in and <ol type="i"><li>First asks Jules Evans about <a name="48"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/P/Author_Plato.htm">Plato</A> and the <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_100.htm">Soul</A><SUP>18</SUP>. Evans rehearses <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_19">Plato s</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_19"></A> account of the multi-partite soul whose parts war against one another. Also, no blank slate, but a history of ideas  even from a previous life. </li><li>Barry Smith chips in  Plato is misleading us about the separation of the mind from the body, as have we all  as we went round the table . Yet, what makes me  me includes a lot of bodily awareness, and if any of it goes awry you get a very fragmented sense of self, and <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_119.htm">psychopathologies</A><SUP>20</SUP> that are hard to understand  eg. disowning parts of your body, or denying they are controlling a moving limb.</li><li>Paul Broks agrees, and comes up with another example: someone with a strong sense of self, but who believes he doesn t exist  who believes he s dead  called Cotard s <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_21">Delusion</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_21"></A>. We are  he suggests  just getting to grips with the brain functioning that leads to such bizarre states. </li><li>But, he thinks we re  burdened with a belief in the soul  even though we probably don t have souls  and are living an illusion; but it s a necessary illusion without which we couldn t function as human beings  as human <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_22">animals</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_22"></A>. </li><li>Jules Evans responds by saying we are most ourselves when we go beyond that little self and relate to others. </li><li>Barry Smith agrees with the  self and other aspect: our own self is very much affected by our dealings with others; right from the beginning, as when infants respond to attention.</li><li>Melvyn Bragg then asks  just what is the self if it s shaped by a million and one things ?</li><li>Barry Smith responds by returning to the body, which structures our experience and puts limits on  what s you and what s not you . He suggests  referring to Alison Kennedy  that fiction extends the mind and our on-line selves are extending the mind far beyond the limits of the body. </li><li>Jules Evans: we can be possessed by fictional characters, and have our behaviour guided by them. </li><li>Alison Kennedy: we don t give enough weight to the self being affected by what it interacts with; cultures can steer people. </li><li>Barry Smith: we take it as normal to get into the mind of another character, but it s very strange. </li><li>Paul Broks: We re all fictional characters, from the first person perspective. </li><li>Jules Evans: KGB operatives influenced by James Bond, and gangsters influenced by gangster movies. </ol> </li></ul></li><li><b>Talk 1</b>: Paul Broks on John Locke and Personal Identity: <a name="W2706W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qgcgx" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <ul type="disc"><li>How could I stop being me? Well, someone with Alzheimer s who loses their memory almost stops being the same person. Memory seems to be crucial to personal identity. </li><li>Potted biography of <a name="49"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/L/Author_Locke (John).htm">John Locke</A>. Like Descartes, Locke saw the mind and body as divided and the <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_98.htm">Self</A><SUP>23</SUP> as the union of the two. </li><li>Peter <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_24">Millican</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_24"></A>: <ol type="i"><li>Locke s interested in what makes someone the same person from one moment to another. Starts from identity generally. For particles of matter, follow their space-time path. But <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">persons</A><SUP>25</SUP> are more difficult because of <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TEs</A><SUP>26</SUP>: prince and the pauper. To make sense of that, we have to invoke continuity of <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_61.htm">consciousness</A><SUP>27</SUP>; essentially being aware  via memory  of being the same conscious person over time.</li><li>The then universal belief in an <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>28</SUP> caused a problem as we need an account of personal identity that can potentially allow us to survive bodily <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_67.htm">death</A><SUP>29</SUP>, and Locke identifies the solution as continuity of consciousness. </ol></li><li>We now have a really interesting discussion of <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_46.htm">teletransportation</A><SUP>30</SUP>, one of the TEs <a name="50"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/P/Author_Parfit (Derek).htm">Derek Parfit</A> and others came up with in the 1960s that challenged <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_31">Locke s</A></U><SUB>31</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_31"></A> basic idea. <ol type="i"><li>Star Trek-like teleporters start to be used for long distance travel. Scanning, vaporisation ( discorporation ) & a stream of data & molecular <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_32">reassembly</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_32"></A>. </li><li>Paul Broks and Peter Millican discuss the TE as so-far described, and Millican says that his initial thought  and I agree  is that  it s a way to die . But suppose that millions of people were doing this, and apparently not regretting it; there is no more air travel as it s no longer financially viable & well, I might rethink things.  The evidence is that people seem to be carrying on their (quasi-) lives happily enough, so maybe we d come to the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_33">conclusion</A></U><SUB>33</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_33"></A> that people really are <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_34">constituted</A></U><SUB>34</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_34"></A> by bundles of information that can be transmitted in the way envisaged. </li><li>The  conceit of the drama is of our hero using teleportation to get to his dying father s bed-side. But, something goes wrong (the  branch line case ) where the vaporisation doesn t happen, but the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_35">scanning</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_35"></A> and reassembly goes ahead as planned. Then a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_36">replica</A></U><SUB>36</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_36"></A> of our hero says goodbye to the dying father. </li><li>So, says <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_37">Broks</A></U><SUB>37</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_37"></A>), we seem to have two people who <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_38">are</A></U><SUB>38</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_38"></A> initially  absolutely <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_39">identical</A></U><SUB>39</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_39"></A> memories . So, for Locke, these two people are identical, which is a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_40">contradiction</A></U><SUB>40</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_40"></A>. </li><li>The twist  and maybe this is in <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_41">Parfit</A></U><SUB>41</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_41"></A>  is that the vaporisation is still to take place once the fault is realised. The teletransportee is told this is about to happen and naturally doesn t like the prospect  but should he, given that the transport worked fine and  he (at least the reassembled  he ) got there in time?</li><li>There s an interesting altercation between the two selves  the one about to be vaporised and the teletransportee  in which the latter tries to persuade the former that the only issue is one of timing  he d <u>used</u> teletransportation as a method of travel many times before and been perfectly happy with it  he d <u>believed</u> that it was just a form of travel. There s perfect continuity of memory, hopes and dreams, and  that s what it is to be a person . He claims that his former self knows and believes this  else why would he have agreed to use teletransportation in the first place?</li><li>He has  it is said  been allowed to contact his former self only because he s agreed to his  delayed vaporisation . </li><li>The one about to be vaporised is horrified  this is <u>murder</u>  considers the other  an imposter and is (now, at least) naturally <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_42">unconvinced</A></U><SUB>42</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_42"></A> by the logic of the argument. </ol></li><li>There follows a discussion <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_43">between</A></U><SUB>43</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_43"></A> Peter Millican and Paul Broks on the topic of teletransportation as dramatized above. <ol type="i"><li>It is suggested that we ought not to be concerned about dying. In response to the claim that  it s hard to give rational grounds for <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_44">it</A></U><SUB>44</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_44"></A> , it s suggested that  in the context of the TE  the original himself wants to enjoy the good things that the duplicate ends up enjoying. </li><li>The response is that it s being assumed that there s a definite point of fact whether  it s you or not . While rationally he thinks there isn t, he has such a strong intuition that there is that that is what would worry him. He wants reassurance. </li><li>Such reassurance wasn t forthcoming, and the lesson of the TE is that personhood is a much more fluid concept than Locke would have imagined. </li><li>There s the interesting point that there s an alleged <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_45">parallel</A></U><SUB>45</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_45"></A> between the teletransportation case and our  reconstituting ourselves by  pulling ourselves together after a dreamless <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1138.htm">sleep</A><SUP>46</SUP>. </li><li>So,  it doesn t matter that  in a sense  entering the teletransportation booth is to commit suicide because  there is complete <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>47</SUP> from the moment the duplicate has been reconstituted . There s  nothing <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_48">beyond</A></U><SUB>48</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_48"></A> that . </li><li>That s why  for Broks  it s such a good TE  such a shock to the system. When he first heard Parfit lecture on teletransportation in the 1980s, he thought he was either saying something essentially trivial or he was saying something profoundly important about what it is to be a person, and inclines towards the latter. But if you go along with this, you have to accept that you don t really matter  <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>49</SUP> are the psychological continuities. There isn t really a self, though that isn t how it feels, and we re really quite resistant to dying. </li><li>So, the self is an illusion, but we can t shake off the idea that it feels that there is this immutable self at my core. But  illusion is the wrong term, because we can t step outside of it and recognise it for what it is. Rather, we <u>inhabit</u> the illusion, and that s fundamentally <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what we are</A><SUP>50</SUP>. </ol> </li></ul></li><li><b>Talk 2</b>: Writer AL Kennedy on Sartre and the Individual: <a name="W2708W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qgm0g" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> <ul type="disc"><li>Life will be too short to pursue this. </li></ul></li><li><b>Talk 3</b>: Philosopher Jules Evans on Jung and the Mind: <a name="W2709W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qjq6k" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <ul type="disc"><li>As above. </li></ul></li><li><b>Talk 4</b>: Philosopher Barry Smith on Descartes and Consciousness: <a name="W2710W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05qk1n3" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<ul type="disc"><li>There is something special about the individual mind as each of us has an inner life with which we are immediately acquainted. Whatever populates it  thoughts or feelings  plays a large part in constituting the <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_98.htm">Self</A><SUP>51</SUP> and is what make me  me .</li><li>But what explains the special access I have to my own mental life, and what is it I have special access to? </li><li>Potted introduction to <a name="51"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/D/Author_Descartes (Rene).htm">Rene Descartes</A>: <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_52">Cogito</A></U><SUB>52</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_52"></A> ergo sum. Our own existence is all we can be sure of  all else is  mere perception . The body is a machine and the mind non-material and outside the laws of nature. Mind and body are separate but inextricably linked and influence one another  hugely ; just how  the mind-body problem  remains the subject of philosophical debate. </li><li>Whatever might be my relation to my body, Descartes was convinced that I couldn t be in doubt about the contents of my own mind, which I know in a way I know no-one else s. It s this special relationship with my own mental life that makes me  me ; it makes me feel the author of thoughts and the agent of actions. I know what I can do and when I m about to do it. I can t tickle myself because I anticipate what I m about to do and expect the consequences.</li><li><a name="52"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/A/Author_Avramides (Anita).htm">Anita Avramides</A>: rehearsal of the  Cogito . Descartes can t doubt that he s doubting, and if he s thinking, he must exist. </li><li>But (Smith)  if I m the thinking thing, I still need some tools to say what that thing is. </li><li>Avramides: Descartes introduces the term <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_61.htm">Consciousness</A><SUP>53</SUP> and this leads on to the  modern mess </li><li>Smith: that is the mind-body problem  how to locate mind in the world of nature. This was t a problem for Descartes, who located the mind outside the material world. How we address the problem depends on how we characterise the mind.</li><li>Avramides: it s not clear just what s to be incorporated in the term  Consciousness . <a name="53"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/F/Author_Frede (Michael).htm">Michael Frede</A> called this the  Cartesian shift . What Descartes had in mid was something very wide-ranging  everything that goes on in the mind including feelings and emotions. My inner life is indubitable, incorrigible, infallible and  controversially  transparent to me. </li><li>Smith: Descartes view of the mind was radically new  but few would now accept this view of the mind as fully known and fully transparent. Some even doubt whether there is such a thing as the Self. But, what sustains the sense of Self, and what role does the body play in maintaining the continuous feeling of being ourselves? For this we need to understand the links between the brain and the body. </li><li>Chris <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21153_54">Frith</A></U><SUB>54</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21153_54"></A>: What s the most relevant sense of self? Our sense of agency and control. </li><li>Smith: This can go missing following neurological damage. Eg. if to the left parietal area, patients may report that their left arm moves of its own accord. Some schizophrenics think the arm is operated by someone else. </li><li>Frith: I predict what s going to happen when I move my hand, and if the sensations I get are what I predicted then I assume the movement is due to me, but otherwise I assume that something in the outside world is impinging on me. This predictability explains why I can t tickle myself, and why  as has been found experimentally by Frith  some schizophrenics <u>can</u> tickle themselves, because they can t predict the consequences of their own actions.</li><li>Smith: Descartes idea was that  while I might disown my body, I can t disown my thoughts. So, is this the ultimate stopping point for our sense of self?</li><li>Frith: No  one of the most mysterious symptoms of schizophrenia is  thought insertion  where patients say  these are not my thoughts , even though they agree they are in their minds. </li><li>Smith: so is the issue less with things immediately going on but more to do with our predictions, which tend to be better in our own case than for others? </li><li>Frith: an interesting question. It s certainly all about predicting what s going to happen to us. Experiments with normal people shows that most of our experience is based on the prediction rather than on what actually happens, and only if what happens is very deviant do we become aware of it. Normal experience is mostly hallucination that most of the time corresponds with reality! Philosophers think that for our own actions we have privileged access: this is true because for other people s actions  while we can see them we don t get the proprioceptive feedback. But most of our cognitive processes go along at the sub-personal  unconscious level. </li><li>Smith: Descartes assumed that it was always  I that was having my thought. While familiar, this is not inevitable. But, when we look at pathological cases, are we moving too far away from the normal? It s a mistake to think <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_119.htm">pathology</A><SUP>55</SUP> cannot cast light on the normal case. Instead, pathological fragmentation of self shows just how many pieces have to be put together to orchestrate that single unified feeling of being  me . </li></ul> </li></ol><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>See <a name="W2584W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04bwydw/broadcasts/2015/08" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (Defunct) for the BBC home-page for this series of talks.<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ol type="1"><li>This is a series of 4 short talks (10 minutes or so)  one each by the main contributors  in the <em>BBC Radio 4</em> Series <em>A History of Ideas</em> hosted by Melvyn Bragg. </li><li>There is a short introductory seminar, which I think pre-empts the talks somewhat. </li><li>The  omnibus edition just concatenates the 5 sessions. </li><li>This is the 9th of 12 weekly series. Some of the others look interesting. The other 11 (with links to the omnibus podcasts) are (in reverse order):- <ol type="i"><li><a name="38"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21047.htm">Potter (Harry), Shears (Tara), Carlisle (Clare) & Broks (Paul) - How Can I Know Anything at All?</A>",</li><li>What is Love? <a name="W2692W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b063dgsc" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>How Should We Live Together? <a name="W2693W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b062n4nx" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>What Is Justice? <a name="W2695W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05prq84" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>How Do I Live a Good Life? <a name="W2696W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05ny7pc" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>How Has Technology Changed Us? <a name="W2697W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b050c5p9" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>What Makes Us Human? <a name="W2698W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04yk3w5" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>How Did Everything Begin? <a name="W2699W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04xs4bq" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>How Can I Tell Right from Wrong? <a name="W2700W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04pvp8m" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>Why Are Things Beautiful? <a name="W2701W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04pcd5k" TARGET = "_top">Link</A></li><li>What Does It Mean to be Free? <a name="W2702W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04nvkkh" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </ol></li></ol><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_4"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: But not in the same order as the talks will be delivered.<a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I know Barry  see <a name="54"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Smith (Barry C.).htm">Barry C. Smith</A>  well, as he was Head of School at Birkbeck when I was studying for my BA, and I had a lot of dealings with him when running the Birkbeck Philosophy Society. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_7"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_7"><B>Footnote 7</B></A></U>: This seems a bit muddled  I think this is a slip, and that the contention is that many have doubted that there is any such thing as an enduring self, but we still feel that there is. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_8"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Paul Broks is a  Regular in this series. </li><li>See <a name="55"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Broks (Paul).htm">Paul Broks</A>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_11"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_11"><B>Footnote 11</B></A></U>: Presumably, this is a much deeper issue than the  Binding Problem that asks how the various senses combine in perception. See <a name="W2733W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binding_problem" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>, <a name="W2734W"></a><A HREF = "https://psychlopedia.wikispaces.com/Binding+Problem?responseToken=04629a6804b40d5c041b8509b88bdec52" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> and many others. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_12"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_12"><B>Footnote 12</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I agree with this, but it s running together minds and brains. </li><li>Essentially solitary creatures may have no sense of self  let us grant  but would still have minds. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_13"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_13"><B>Footnote 13</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>So Broks is  here at any rate  siding with Locke and the <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">PV</a> of Personal Identity. </li><li>Naturally, I d say that it s the same <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">Individual</a>, even if that individual does not have the same <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_92.htm">Personality</a>.</li><li>The term  <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">Person</a> is an honorific that attaches to individuals with certain properties. I agree that it might not apply to a human individual with a badly damaged brain. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_14"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_14"><B>Footnote 14</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>See <a name="56"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/K/Author_Kennedy (A.L.).htm">A.L. Kennedy</A>. </li><li>As she s a stand-up comedian, much of what she says in this introduction  or at least how she says it  needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_15"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_15"><B>Footnote 15</B></A></U>: See <a name="57"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/E/Author_Evans (Jules).htm">Jules Evans</A>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_17"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_17"><B>Footnote 17</B></A></U>: This expression comes from Hamlet:- <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"> Who would Fardels bear, <BR>To grunt and sweat under a weary life,<BR>But that the dread of something after death,<BR>The undiscovered Country, from whose bourn<BR>No Traveller returns, Puzzles the will,<BR>And makes us rather bear those ills we have,<BR>Than fly to others that we know not of. </ul> </FONT><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_19"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_19"><B>Footnote 19</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The parts are Appetitive, Spirited, and Rational. </li><li>This may or may not differ from <a name="58"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/A/Author_Aristotle.htm">Aristotle</A> s Vegetable, Animal, Rational distinction. I m no expert. </li><li>Maybe see <a name="39"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8732.htm">Irwin (Terence) - Republic IV: The Division of the Soul</A>", and <a name="40"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17999.htm">Lorenz (Hendrik) - Ancient Theories of Soul</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_21"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_21"><B>Footnote 21</B></A></U>: See Wikipedia - <a name="W2740W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cotard_delusion" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_22"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_22"><B>Footnote 22</B></A></U>: So, can I add Paul Broks to my list of <a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_50.htm">animalists</a>? <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_24"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_24"><B>Footnote 24</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Peter Millican is a regular consultant in this series. </li><li>See <a name="59"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/M/Author_Millican (Peter).htm">Peter Millican</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_31"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_31"><B>Footnote 31</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Broks says  this , but  Locke s is what he means.</li><li>This is  to me  a new take on <a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_89.htm">Parfit</a>, which I d understood in one sense to be more radical  that the whole idea of identity didn t matter for  <a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_14.htm">survival</a>  while being rather conservative in retaining the <a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">PV</a>.</li><li>But, maybe this is what s intended. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_32"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_32"><B>Footnote 32</B></A></U>: This doesn t mean reassembly from the same molecules  indeed  reassembly is a very tendentious description, as it assumes the very same individual is being reassembled, rather than a new one constructed from new molecules according to a template. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_33"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_33"><B>Footnote 33</B></A></U>: Well, we might, but we ought not to  we d just be following the crowd, when we know theoretically that there are other  and better  ways of explain the  evidence  in terms of annihilation and replication. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_34"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_34"><B>Footnote 34</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>In what way is  <a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_62.htm">constituted</a> used here? Does it imply identity?</li><li>Just what are the persistence conditions of  bundles of information ? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_35"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_35"><B>Footnote 35</B></A></U>: It s interesting to consider whether the scanning would be possible without the vaporisation. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_36"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_36"><B>Footnote 36</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The story is told from the perspective of our hero  who naturally takes himself to be himself, rather than the teletransportee being so.</li><li>Of course, if <a name="32"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">perdurantism</a> is true  or maybe anyway  we have a case of <a name="33"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">fission</a> wherein  in a sense  both fission products  are our hero  they just shared stages pre-teletransportation. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_37"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_37"><B>Footnote 37</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>There s a little debate here  I m not quite sure whether it s Broks and Millican, or Broks and his producer (Jolyon Jenkins)</li><li>Jolyon Jenkins is a serious individual who makes his own documentaries. He s introduced right at the beginning of the programme. </li><li>So, the bulk of the dialogue might be between him and Paul Broks. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_38"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_38"><B>Footnote 38</B></A></U>: Note this   are & not  have . <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_39"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_39"><B>Footnote 39</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>It s better to say  exactly similar . </li><li>But Broks has a slight pause & it s the  memories that are supposed  at the point of duplication  to be  identical . </li><li>It s worth asking just what sort of thing a  <a name="34"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_84.htm">memory</a> is. A trope, or a <a name="35"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universal</a>, and</li><li>Just what does it take for two memories to be  identical ?</li><li>Maybe see <a name="41"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21148.htm">Schaffer (Jonathan) - The Individuation Of Tropes</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_40"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_40"><B>Footnote 40</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I read somewhere recently an account claiming that this need not be the case; that two spatially-separated bodies can indeed  be the same person . </li><li>Maybe it s <a name="42"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20898.htm">Miller (Kristie) - Travelling in Time: How to Wholly Exist in Two Places at the Same Time</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_41"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_41"><B>Footnote 41</B></A></U>: I need to check this!<a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_42"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_42"><B>Footnote 42</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>As well he ought to be. This argument can run both ways:- <ol type="1"><li>Either it shows inconsistency on the part of the person about to be vaporised, and runs correctly as a <em>modus ponens</em>, as in the discussion</li><li>Or it should be run as a <em>modus tollens</em> to show the absurdity of thinking of teletransportation as anything other than death and duplication. </li></ol></li><li>I think the second interpretation is the more sensible, as well as being the most popular. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_43"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_43"><B>Footnote 43</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I found it difficult to determine who was speaking  not only who s talking when, but whether it s the producer rather than Millican who s the interlocutor. </li><li>But it doesn t really matter, as both interlocutors seem to be in fundamental agreement. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_44"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_44"><B>Footnote 44</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Ie. our clinging to life.</li><li>Given the incredible nature of this claim, I can t but think that the ensuing discussion is rather inadequate by way of justification. </li><li>It doesn t proceed along the old Epicurean lines of  death is nothing to us , but is specifically related to Parfit s TE.</li><li>For death, <a name="36"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_67.htm">Click here for Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_45"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_45"><B>Footnote 45</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I think we have to hold the line here. </li><li>Imagine two computers running  identical programs. We shut the lids and they go into hibernation  the analogy of a dreamless sleep  and then open the lids again. We still have two computers  identified by spatiotemporal continuity  and one hasn t become the other. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_48"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_48"><B>Footnote 48</B></A></U>: I still think my distinction between forward and backward continuity is important. <a name="37"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_38.htm">Click here for Note</A>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_52"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_52"><B>Footnote 52</B></A></U>: This argument still seems to have legs. See <a name="43"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21056.htm">O'Brien (Lucy) - Ambulo Ergo Sum</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P21153_54"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21153_54"><B>Footnote 54</B></A></U>: Cognitive neuroscientist. See <a name="60"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/F/Author_Frith (Christopher D.).htm">Christopher D. Frith</A> <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:32" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:32:53</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>