First-Personal Aspects of Agency
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Metaphilosophy, 42(1-2):1–16, 2011
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this Paper


Author’s Abstract

  1. On standard accounts, actions are caused by reasons (Davidson), and reasons are taken to be neural phenomena. Since neural phenomena are wholly understandable from a third-person perspective, standard views have no room for any ineliminable first-personal elements in an account of the causation1 of action.
  2. I aim to show that first-person perspectives play essential roles in both human and nonhuman agency. Nonhuman agents have rudimentary first-person perspectives, whereas human agents — at least rational agents and moral agents — have robust first-person perspectives.
  3. I conclude with a view of intentional causation2, according to which reasons are constituted by (but not identical to) neural phenomena. The idea of constitution without identity allows for a causal account of action that automatically includes first-personal aspects of agency.

Comment:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - July 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page