On the Mind-Dependence of Temporal Becoming
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 39:341–57, 1979
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. In all the discussions of the thesis of the mind-dependence of temporal becoming, there has been relatively little effort to explore and develop the thesis itself: What is meant by mind-dependence in the context of temporal becoming?
  2. The overriding aim of the most prominent advocate of the mind-dependence thesis, Adolf Grunbaum, has been able to show that becoming is unlike the temporal relations of succession and simultaneity in that becoming is not a mind-independent feature of the physical universe. The controversy spawned by the mind-dependence thesis, however, has made it increasingly urgent to clarify the thesis.
  3. What follows is an elaboration of what is and is not involved in Grunbaum's claim that temporal becoming is mind-dependent.

Comment:

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