- A number of different issues travel under the banner of "the problem of personal identity." My interests, like those of many other philosophers, are metaphysical.
- In the first instance, I am not concerned with what is called "narrative identity1," or with how we re-identify a person, or with psychological aspects of personality, or with ascriptions of the word "person."
- "The problem of personal identity over time," as formulated by Harold Noonan, "is the problem of giving an account of the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for a person identified at one time being the same person as a person identified at another" time ("Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity", 2003).
- If, as I believe, you and I are essentially persons, then we are persons at any moment that we exist. (We could not change into non-persons and still exist.) This is not uncontroversial, but I have argued at length for this view of persons elsewhere ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View", 2000, "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism", 2007).
- In any case, a metaphysical account of personal identity should be tied to an account of the nature of persons, and that is how I shall proceed.
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