Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 3
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract1

  1. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective"), I survey four attempts to naturalize the first-person perspective2, either by reduction or by elimination (John Perry and David Lewis in Chapter 3; Daniel Dennett and Thomas Metzinger in Chapter 4) and conclude that each is inadequate.
  2. Each attempt either leaves a residue of the first-person perspective3 in the metaphysical account or suffers from internal incoherence.
  3. Part of Chapter 3 comes from "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Does Naturalism Rest on a Mistake?" (2011).

Sections
  1. John Perry and an Epistemic Account of the Self – 49
  2. David Lewis4 on De Se Belief – 56
  3. A Comment on John Searle – 61
  4. Does Cognitive Science Save the Day for Naturalism? – 63
  5. Conclusion – 72



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective: What Is The Problem?".


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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