A Metaphysical Framework for the First-Person Perspective
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 8
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract1

  1. In Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-Person Perspective"), I turn to the metaphysics of the first-person perspective.
  2. In Chapter 8, I discuss first-personal properties, dispositional properties and, briefly, haecceities.

Sections
  1. First-Person Properties – 172
  2. Dispositional Properties – 173
  3. Haecceitistic Implications – 179
  4. Conclusion – 182



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective: What Is The Problem?".


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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