Natural Reality
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, Chapter 10
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract1

  1. In Chapter 10, I discuss a conception of natural reality that I take to be adequate to the common-sense world that we interact with.
  2. The conception, which I call "near-naturalism," is a very weak version of non-reductivism that recognizes first-person perspectives2 in the inventory of properties that make an irreplaceable contribution to reality.
  3. Using a notion of property-constitution, I argue that everyday properties are casually efficacious without being reducible to micro- or micro-based properties. I argue for the reality of ontological emergentism and downward causation3.
  4. Finally, I consider in what respect this conception of natural reality is naturalistic.

  1. Near-Naturalism – 207
  2. Property-Constitution and Causation4 – 209
  3. Emergentism and Downward Causation5 – 220
  4. How Naturalistic Is Near-Naturalism? – 233

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Taken from "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective: What Is The Problem?".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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