<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Cerullo (Michael A.) - Uploading and Branching Identity (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21651.htm">Uploading and Branching Identity</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/C/Author_Cerullo (Michael A.).htm">Cerullo (Michael A.)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Minds & Machines (2015) 25:17 36</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21651.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperCitings_21651.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PapersToNotes_21651.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s Abstract</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>If a brain is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21651_1">uploaded</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21651_1"></A> into a computer, will consciousness continue in digital <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21651_2">form</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21651_2"></A> or will it end forever when the brain is destroyed? Philosophers have long debated such dilemmas and classify them as questions about personal identity. </li><li>There are currently three main theories of personal identity: <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_53.htm">biological</A><SUP>3</SUP>, <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">psychological</A><SUP>4</SUP>, and closest <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_41.htm">continuer</A><SUP>5</SUP> theories. None of these theories can successfully address the questions posed by the possibility of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21651_6">uploading</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21651_6"></A>. I will argue that <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploading</A><SUP>7</SUP> requires us to adopt a new theory of identity, psychological <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21651_8">branching</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21651_8"></A> identity. </li><li>Psychological branching identity states that consciousness will continue as long as there is continuity in psychological structure. What differentiates this from psychological identity is that it allows <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21651_9">identity</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21651_9"></A> to continue in multiple selves. According to branching identity, continuity of consciousness will continue in <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21651_10">both</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21651_10"></A> the original brain and the <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">upload</A><SUP>11</SUP> after non-destructive <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploading</A><SUP>12</SUP>. </li><li>Branching identity can also resolve long standing questions about <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_116.htm">split-brain</A><SUP>13</SUP> syndrome and can provide clear predictions about identity in even the most <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21651_14">difficult</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21651_14"></A> cases imagined by philosophers. </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Author s Conclusion</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>If we fully accept the empirical observations in split-brain syndrome we are led away from traditional views of identity. Instead, we are drawn towards a theory of identity where the continuity of consciousness can continue in multiple branches. Contrary to the assumptions of past philosophers, there is nothing incoherent or absurd about branching identity. We have limited intuition about things far removed from our day to day experience. Common sense physics has been overthrown by quantum mechanics and relatively. In a similar way we need to expand our views of personal identity. When we closely examine the possibility of branching identity it is not as unintuitive as we might initially suppose and can be abstractly understood in the same way we can come to understand modern physics. </li><li>When discussing consciousness we can never expect complete certainty. We cannot know with certainty that solipsism is false or that we are not day-people who die each night when we fall asleep. Yet our common experience has led us away from such views. Questions about personal identity are empirical questions, and just like any other fact about the universe and they will always be open to revision. Yet our best current understanding leads us to branching identity. The empirical evidence (split-brain syndrome) supports branching identity. Only branching identity can provide specific predictions in even the most outlandish scenarios. Finally, popping and fading/dancing qualia arguments support branching identity. </li><li><a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">Uploading</A><SUP>15</SUP> has the potential to change the way we understand ourselves and our place in the universe. The breath-taking pace of technology has brought us to the point today where all the technology necessary for <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploading</A><SUP>16</SUP> is now feasible. If the progression of technology continues and animal experiments demonstrate the feasibility of <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploading</A><SUP>17</SUP> then this should be viewed as life extension technology. Brain preservation and later destructive <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploading</A><SUP>18</SUP> will preserve continuity of consciousness. The rational choice is to spend whatever resources are necessary to understand, develop, and apply this technology to those who choose to use it. The answer to our ultimate question is yes, it will be you that wakes up inside the computer. </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li>Theories of Identity</li><li>The Failure of the Standard Approaches to Identity</li><li>Machine Consciousness</li><li><a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">Uploading</A><SUP>19</SUP> and the Standard Theories of Personal Identity</li><li>Branching Identity and Intuition</li><li>Conclusion </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Books & Papers Cited</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>Breitmeyer, B., & Ogden, H. (2000). Recent models and findings in visual backward masking: A comparison, review and update. Perception and Psychophysics, 62, 1572 1595. </li><li><a name="27"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8491.htm">Chalmers (David) - Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness</A>" (1995a). </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21651_20">Chalmers</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21651_20"></A>, D. (1995b). Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. In T. Metzinger (Ed.), Conscious experience (pp. 309 328). Imprint Academic. </li><li><a name="44"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_74.htm">Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory</A>" D. (1996). </li><li><a name="28"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21672.htm">Chalmers (David) - The singularity: A philosophical analysis</A>" (2010). </li><li>Corabi, J., & Schneider, S. (2012). The metaphysics of <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploading</A><SUP>21</SUP>. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 19(7 8), 26 44. </li><li>Corballis, M. (2009). The evolution and genetics of cerebral asymmetry. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364(1519), 867 879. </li><li>Coren, S., Ward, L., & Enns, J. (2004). Sensation and perception (6th ed.). New York: Wiley. </li><li><a name="29"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21670.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Temporal Consciousness</A>" (2014). <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21651_22">Supplement</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21651_22"></A>. </li><li>Efron, R. (1970). The minimum duration of a perception. Neurophysiologia, 8, 57 63. </li><li>Eth, D., Foust, J., & Whale, B. (2013). The prospects of whole brain emulation within the next half century. Journal of Artificial General Intelligence, 4(3), 130 152. </li><li>Galaburda, A., Rosen, G., & Sherman, G. (1990). Individual variability in cortical organization: Its relationship to brain laterality and implications to function. Neuropsychologia, 28(6), 529 546. </li><li>Gazzaniga, M. (1967). The split brain in man. Scientific American, 217(2), 24 29. </li><li>Gazzaniga, M. S., Bogen, J. E., & Sperry, R. W. (1962). Some functional effects of sectioning the cerebral <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_116.htm">commissures</A><SUP>23</SUP> in man. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 48, 1765 1769. </li><li><a name="30"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21671.htm">Hayworth (Kenneth) - Killed by bad philosophy:Why brain preservation followed by mind uploading is a cure for death</A>" (2010). </li><li>Hayworth, K. (2012). Electron imaging technology for whole brain neural circuit mapping. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 4(1). </li><li><a name="31"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_714.htm">Jackson (Frank) - Epiphenomenal Qualia</A>" (1982). </li><li><a name="32"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_38.htm">Jackson (Frank) - What Mary Didn't Know</A>" (1986). </li><li>Kandel, E., Schwartz, J., & Jessell, T. (2000). Principles of neural science (4 edn.). New York: McGraw- Hill. </li><li>Knott, G., Marchman, H., Wall, D., & Lich, B. (2008). Serial section scanning electron microscopy of adult brain tissue using focused ion beam milling. The Journal of Neuroscience, 28(12), 2959 2964. </li><li><a name="45"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4136.htm">Kurzweil (Ray) - The Age of Spiritual Machines</A>" (1999). </li><li>Kurzweil, R. (2005). The singularity is near: When humans transcend biology. New York, NY: Penguin Press. </li><li><a name="33"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_19/Abstract_19208.htm">Levin (Janet) - Functionalism</A>" (2013).</li><li>Levy, J. (1977). The mammalian brain and the adaptive advantage of cerebral asymmetry. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 299, 264 272. </li><li>Ludlow, Peter, Nagasawa, Yujin, & Stoljar, Daniel (Eds.). (2004). There s something about Mary: Essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson s knowledge argument. Cambridge: MIT Press. </li><li>MacNeilage, P., Rogers, L., & Vallortigara, G. (2009). Origins of the left and right brain. Scientific American, 301, 60 67. </li><li><a name="34"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_190.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness</A>" (1971). </li><li><a name="35"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_564.htm">Nida-Rumelin (Martine) - Qualia: The Knowledge Argument</A>" (2010). </li><li><a name="36"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_17/Abstract_17915.htm">Olson (Eric) - Personal Identity (Stanford, 2010)</A>" (2010). </li><li>Oncel, D., Demetriades, D., Gruen, P., et al. (2007). Brain lobectomy for severe head injuries is not a hopeless procedure. Journal of Trauma, 63(5), 1010 1013. </li><li><a name="37"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6702.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity and Rationality</A>" (1982). </li><li><a name="46"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>" (1984). </li><li>Pockett, S. (2003). How long is  now ? Phenomenology and the specious present. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2, 55 68. </li><li>Pulsifer, M., Brandt, J., Salorio, C., et al. (2004). The cognitive outcome of hemispherectomy in 71 children. Epilepsia, 4(3), 243 254. </li><li>Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological predicates. In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind, and religion (pp. 37 48). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. </li><li><a name="47"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_141.htm">Putnam (Hilary) - Representation and Reality</A>" (1988). </li><li><a name="38"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11924.htm">Robinson (Howard) - Dualism (Stanford)</A>" (2012). </li><li>Ruhnau, E. (1995). Time gestalt and the observer. In Metzinger (Ed.), Conscious experience. Paderborn: Schoningh; Exeter: Imprint Academic. </li><li>Sandberg, A. (2013). Feasibility of whole brain emulation. In Muller, V. C. (Ed.), Theory and philosophy of artificial intelligence (SAPERE) (pp. 251 64). Berlin: Springer. </li><li><a name="39"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21673.htm">Sandberg (Anders) & Bostrom (Nick) - Whole Brain Emulation: A Roadmap</A>" (2008). </li><li><a name="40"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1791.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account</A>" (1984). </li><li>Spiers, H., Maguire, E., & Burgess, N. (2001). Hippocampal amnesia. Neurocase, 7, 357 382. </li><li>Springer, J., Binder, J., Hammeke, T., et al. (1999). Language dominance in neurologically normal and epilepsy subjects: A functional MRI study. Brain, 122(11), 2033 2046. </li><li>Stanley, R. (1999). Qualia space. <a name="48"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3481.htm">JCS - Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 06, Issue 01 (1999)</A>", 49 60. </li><li><a name="41"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1792.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory</A>" (1984). </li><li><a name="49"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_156.htm">Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", P. (1990). </li><li>Vallortigara, G., & Rogers, L. (2005). Survival with an asymmetrical brain: Advantages and disadvantages of cerebral lateralization. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(4), 575 589. </li></ul> </FONT><BR><U>Comments</U><ol type="1"><li> </li><li> </li></ol><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>The paper is open access and available from Springer at <a name="W3302W"></a><A HREF = "https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11023-014-9352-8" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P21651_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21651_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a bad start! A <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_55.htm">brain</a> is a physical object, and cannot be <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploaded</a> to a computer. </li><li>What is intended is that the physical structure of that brain can be recorded, and the encoded information <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploaded</a>. </li><li>Then, there is the further claim that this digital brain can in some way process information  and experience qualia  in the same way as a physical brain. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21651_2"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21651_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Again, this is an odd way of expressing things. </li><li> Digital Data cannot be conscious  it would be the computer that is conscious. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21651_6"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21651_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: OK, but they only need to cope with  <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploading</a> if this is metaphysically possible. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21651_8"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21651_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>:  <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_12.htm">Identity</a> can only <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">branch</a> if we adopt a 4-dimentionalist  eg. <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">perdurantist</a>  approach to <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_90.htm">persistence</a>. There s nothing about this in the bibliography. <a name="On-Page_Link_P21651_9"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21651_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: Cerullo is far too sloppy in the use of this term. He d be better off using the term  <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_14.htm">survival</a> , as <a name="43"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/P/Author_Parfit (Derek).htm">Derek Parfit</A>, which is (allegedly) not necessarily identity-preserving. . <a name="On-Page_Link_P21651_10"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21651_10"><B>Footnote 10</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>If we park the idea whether digital computers can in fact be conscious, and ignore issues of whether we have strict numerical identity, we still have an interesting question here. </li><li>The issue is raised by reawakening after a period of dreamless <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1138.htm">sleep</a> as compared to awakening from scratch (as a computer). </li><li>Caveats aside, it would  feel the same in both cases  but there s more to it than just a technical quibble that the computer isn t strictly-speaking identical to the brain that was <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1246.htm">uploaded</a>. </li><li>The question is whether the very same consciousness carries forward to the computer or just a copy. If something eternally unpleasant is to happen to that computer (or to the experience of  my consciousness running on that computer), should I be personally worried? </li><li>See the  Future Great Pain <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_940.htm">Test</a> . </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P21651_14"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21651_14"><B>Footnote 14</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>We ll see just which cases are considered!</li><li>The  split-brain case is  I think  wrongly described in this paper. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21651_20"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21651_20"><B>Footnote 20</B></A></U>: Maybe the same as <a name="42"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8487.htm">Chalmers (David) - Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia</A>" <a name="On-Page_Link_P21651_22"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21651_22"><B>Footnote 22</B></A></U>: I m not sure what this is. <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:40" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:40:21</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>