The Representational Deep Structure of the Phenomenal First-Person Perspective
Metzinger (Thomas)
Source: Metzinger (Thomas) - Being No One, Chapter 6
Paper - Abstract

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Sections

  1. What is a phenomenal self-model? – 299
  2. Multilevel constraints for self-consciousness1: What turns a neural system-model into a phenomenal self? – 305
    1. Global availability of system-related information – 305
    2. Situatedness and virtual self-presence – 310
    3. Being-in-a-world: Full immersion – 313
    4. Convolved holism of the phenomenal self – 320
    5. Dynamics of the phenomenal self – 324
    6. Transparency: From system-model to phenomenal self – 330
    7. Virtual phenomenal selves – 340
    8. Adaptivity: The self-model as a tool and as a weapon – 344
  3. Descriptive levels of the human self-model – 353
    1. Neural correlates – 353
    2. Cognitive correlates – 361
    3. Social correlates – 362
  4. Levels of content within the human self-model – 379
    1. Spatial and nonspatial content – 380
    2. Transparent and opaque content – 386
    3. The attentional subject – 390
    4. The cognitive subject – 395
    5. Agency – 405
  5. Perspectivalness: The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation – 411
    1. Global availability of transient subject-object relations – 420
    2. Phenomenal presence of a knowing self – 421
    3. Phenomenal presence of an agent – 422
  6. The self-model theory of subjectivity – 427

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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