<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Bird (Alexander) & Tobin (Emma) - Natural Kinds (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21723.htm">Natural Kinds</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Bird (Alexander).htm">Bird (Alexander)</a> & <A HREF = "../../Authors/T/Author_Tobin (Emma).htm">Tobin (Emma)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2008-17</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21723.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PapersToNotes_21723.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21723_1">Authors Introduction</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21723_1"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Scientific disciplines frequently divide the particulars they study into kinds and theorize about those kinds. To say that a kind is <em>natural</em> is to say that it corresponds to a grouping that reflects the structure of the natural world rather than the interests and actions of human beings. We tend to assume that science is often successful in revealing these kinds; it is a corollary of scientific realism that when all goes well the classifications and taxonomies employed by science correspond to the real kinds in nature. The existence of these real and independent kinds of things is held to justify our scientific inferences and practices. </li><li>Putative examples of kinds may be found in all scientific disciplines. Chemistry provides what are taken by many to be the paradigm examples of kinds, the chemical elements, while chemical compounds, such as H<sub>2</sub>O, are also <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>2</SUP> of stuff. (Instances of a <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>3</SUP> may be manmade, such as artificially synthesized ascorbic acid (vitamin C); but whether chemical kinds all of whose instances are artificial are <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>4</SUP> is open to debate. The synthetic transuranium elements, e.g. Rutherfordium, seem good candidates for <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>5</SUP>, whereas artificial molecular kinds such as Buckminsterfullerene, C<sub>60</sub>, seem less obviously <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>6</SUP>.) The standard model in quantum physics reveals many kinds of fundamental particles (electron, tau neutrino, charm quark), plus broader categories such as kinds of kind (lepton, quark) and higher kinds (fermion, boson). Astronomy classifies the heavenly bodies: galaxies, for example, can be either elliptical, lenticular, or spiral. </li><li>Since kinds are revealed by science, a science can revise which kinds it holds exist: phlogisticated air was regarded as a kind until after Lavoisier's chemical revolution. A science can even question a whole category of kinds. Before being superseded in this regard by the chemical elements, biological species were taken to be the best exemplars of kindhood. Yet now it is somewhat controversial to state that species are <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>7</SUP>. As the world changes, its kinds may change too. Rapidly mutating microorganisms demand new classification systems. Kinds in the social sciences, such as economics or sociology, are even more problematic, since the changing norms and practices of individuals and societies may also be held to be constitutive factors in kind membership, and these norms and practices may themselves respond to our classification of people into kinds. These examples are troublesome because there is some tension between the existence of kinds and the mutability of the particulars which are supposed to fall under those kinds. In the case of atoms or galaxies, the particulars under study are typically long-lived and only slowly changing; viruses and economic structures, on the other hand, are more dynamic. </li><li>This article divides philosophical discussions of <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>8</SUP> into three areas: metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language. <ol type="i"><li>The <b>metaphysics</b> of <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>9</SUP> asks whether we should think of our supposed <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>10</SUP> as genuinely natural. And if they are, what are <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>11</SUP>? And, finally, do <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>12</SUP> have essences? </li><li><b>Philosophy of science</b> is concerned with <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>13</SUP> because, as mentioned above, it is the use of <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>14</SUP> by the individual ( special ) sciences that generates our interest in them. So we may ask, whether the kinds appearing in our best scientific theories do indeed satisfy the theories of <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>15</SUP> proposed by the metaphysicians.</li><li><b>Philosophy of language</b> takes an interest in <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>16</SUP> because basic issues are raised by the semantics of <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>17</SUP> terms. For example, if we think of naming an entity and describing it as, semantically speaking, fundamentally different ways of talking about it, should we think of <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>18</SUP> terms as functioning like names or like descriptions? </ol></li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Contents</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The Metaphysics of <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>19</SUP><ul type="disc"><li>1.1 Natural Classifications</li><li>1.2 <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kind</A><SUP>20</SUP> Realism</li><li>1.3 Essentialism</li></ul></li><li><a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>21</SUP> in the Special Sciences<ul type="disc"><li>2.1 <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>22</SUP> and Biology</li><li>2.2 <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>23</SUP> and Chemistry</li><li>2.3 <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>24</SUP> and Psychology</li><li>2.4 <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>25</SUP> and Social Science</li></ul></li><li>The Semantics of <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kind</A><SUP>26</SUP> Terms<ul type="disc"><li>3.1 Descriptivism and Internalism</li><li>3.2 Arguments Against Descriptivism</li><li>3.3 Direct Reference and Externalism</li><li>3.4 From Reference to Essence? </li></ul></li></ol></FONT><BR><U><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21723_27">Detailed Contents & Notes</A></U><SUB>27</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21723_27"></A></U><ol type="1"><li>The Metaphysics of <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>28</SUP><ul type="disc"><li>1.1 Natural Classifications <ul type="square"><li>1.1.1 Naturalism (weak realism) <ol type="i"><li>Members of a <a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>29</SUP> should have some (natural) properties in common.</li><li><a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</A><SUP>30</SUP> should permit inductive inferences</li><li><a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</A><SUP>31</SUP> should participate in laws of nature</li><li>Members of a <a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>32</SUP> should form a kind</li><li><a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</A><SUP>33</SUP> should form a hierarchy</li><li><a name="32"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</A><SUP>34</SUP> should be categorically distinct</ol></li><li>1.1.2 Conventionalism (aka constructivism or constructionism) <ol type="i"><li>Weak Conventionalism (epistemological)</li><li>Strong Conventionalism (metaphysical)</li><li>Mode of dependence on human activity<ol type="a"><li>Material dependence: we make the kinds.</li><li>Causal dependence: the relevant facts are caused to be true by the fact that they are believed to be true.</li><li>Constitutive dependence: conventions exist in virtue of people holding that they do</ol> </ol></li><li>1.1.3 Promiscuous Realism: <ol type="i"><li><a name="56"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_299.htm">Dupre (John) - The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science</A>". </li><li>Not conventionalist, but the structure of the world is vastly complex and can be categorized in many different crosscutting ways, according to the different theoretical interests we happen to be pursuing. </ol></li></ul></li><li>1.2 <a name="33"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kind</A><SUP>35</SUP> Realism: this is <em>strong realism</em>. It s not just that there s a real distinction between kinds of things that is naturally drawn, irrespective of human interests, but that the <a name="34"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>36</SUP> themselves really exist. So, not just a collection of gold things, but <em>gold</em>. It s possible to be a nominalist about <a name="35"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>37</SUP> (as abstract entities), while being a realist about the natural classification of individuals into kinds. The analogy is with properties and <a name="36"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>38</SUP> (as against classification and <a name="37"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>39</SUP>). <ul type="square"><li>1.2.1 Quine on <a name="38"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>40</SUP> and Induction: Kinds are sets. Kind and similarity are essentially one notion. Degrees of similarity. <em><a name="39"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</A><SUP>41</SUP></em>: Goodman s grue & Hempel s raven paradox. Exemplars of <a name="40"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>42</SUP>  more similar than those of gerrymandered kinds. Induction confirmed by natural properties and their instances. </li><li>1.2.2 Cluster Kind Realism: a <a name="41"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>43</SUP> is formed by a cluster of co-occurring properties. Best examples are biological species. Intrinsic and extrinsic homeostatic mechanisms. </li><li>1.2.3 Fundamentalism and Reductionism: <em>reductionism</em>  <a name="42"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>44</SUP> are species of, or are reducible to, <a name="43"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>45</SUP>. <a name="44"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kind</A><SUP>46</SUP> <em>fundamentalism</em> denies this. Three views:- <ol type="i"><li>Armstrong: weak realism, but no <a name="45"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>47</SUP>. </li><li>Hawley & Bird: <a name="46"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>48</SUP> are complex <a name="47"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>49</SUP>. </li><li>Lowe: <a name="48"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>50</SUP> are substantial <a name="49"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>51</SUP>, an irreducible ontological category. Ellis: also fundamentalist  three hierarchical categories; substantive, dynamic and property kinds. </ol> </li></ul></li><li>1.3 Essentialism</li></ul></li><li><a name="50"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>52</SUP> in the Special Sciences<ul type="disc"><li>2.1 <a name="51"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>53</SUP> and Biology</li><li>2.2 <a name="52"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>54</SUP> and Chemistry</li><li>2.3 <a name="53"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>55</SUP> and Psychology</li><li>2.4 <a name="54"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>56</SUP> and Social Science</li></ul></li><li>The Semantics of <a name="55"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kind</A><SUP>57</SUP> Terms<ul type="disc"><li>3.1 Descriptivism and Internalism</li><li>3.2 Arguments Against Descriptivism</li><li>3.3 Direct Reference and Externalism</li><li>3.4 From Reference to Essence? </li></ul></li></ol><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>First published Wed Sep 17, 2008; substantive revision Tue Jan 27, 2015</li><li>Substantive revision Wed Feb 15, 2017; see <a name="W6685W"></a><A HREF = "https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </li></ul><BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P21723_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21723_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Taken from the 2015 edition. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21723_27"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21723_27"><B>Footnote 27</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Mostly cuts and pastes of section headings and bits of text, but not always. </li><li>I couldn t be bothered to follow my colour conventions. </li><li>Taken from the 2015 edition. </li></ul> <FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:41" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:41:22</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>