<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Lowe (E.J.) - Individuals, Sorts, and Instantiation (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21745.htm">Individuals, Sorts, and Instantiation</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/L/Author_Lowe (E.J.).htm">Lowe (E.J.)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Lowe (E.J.) - More Kinds of Being: Chapter 3</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21745.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperCitings_21745.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PapersToNotes_21745.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Introduction</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Two kinds of 'is' which are commonly conflated by philosophers and logicians are the 'is' of <em>attribution</em>, figuring in a sentence like 'This pen is yellow', and what I call the 'is' of <em>instantiation</em>, figuring in sentences like 'Dobbin <em>is</em> a horse' and 'A horse is a mammal' - that is, sentences of the form 'Such-and-such is (a) &phi;', where '&phi;' is a <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>1</SUP> term and where 'such-and-such' may either be a particular or <em>individual</em> term (like the proper name 'Dobbin') or else again a <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>2</SUP> term. Sentences of this form I shall call <em>instantiation sentences</em>. Before saying more about the 'is' of instantiation, however, I must say something further about the terms, <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>3</SUP> and individual, which may figure in sentences featuring it. </li><li>As we saw in the previous chapter, an important characteristic of <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>4</SUP> terms from a semantic point of view is that they typically have associated with them <em>criteria of identity</em> - unless, perhaps, they designate what I called 'basic' sorts, if indeed such sorts exist. But I would urge, in agreement with <a name="9"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/G/Author_Geach (Peter).htm">Peter Geach</A>, that <em>individual</em> terms - such as proper names - also typically have, as an essential semantic feature, criteria of identity associated with their application. This, it may be observed, runs somewhat counter to the currently popular view that proper names have no Fregean 'sense' and are purely denotative or referential - but <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21745_5">not necessarily wholly counter to it</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21745_5"></A>. I do not want to suggest that the sense of a proper name is the same as that of some identifying description: that, for example, 'Aristotle' might have the sense of 'the tutor of Alexander the Great' or 'the greatest pupil of Plato', say, nor even that the sense of a proper name involves the senses of a 'cluster' (of) such descriptions, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21745_6">as Searle suggests</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21745_6"></A>. What I do hold is that, by whatever means a person may have been introduced to a certain proper name, he has not grasped its correct use unless he has grasped what criterion of identity is associated with it. Thus, for instance, if someone has picked up the name 'Aristotle' from overhearing a conversation amongst philosophers, but does not grasp that it has associated with it the criterion of identity for a <em>man</em> (because, say, he thinks that these philosophers are referring to a <em>book</em>), then I should say that he fails to refer to <em>Aristotle</em> in his subsequent attempts to use the name - indeed, that he fails to refer to <em>anything</em>. </li><li>This thesis concerning the semantics of proper names is, of course, intimately connected with my contention that individuals must always be thought of as being individuals <em>of some sort</em>. The criterion of identity associated with a proper name will just be the one associated with those <em><a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>7</SUP> terms</em> that designate the sort(s) or kind(s) which any individual capable of being referred to by that name instantiates. Thus, 'Aristotle', conceived as a name for a <em>man</em>, must have associated with it the criterion of identity which is also associated with the <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>8</SUP> term 'man'. So I do not - and certainly need not - insist that the sense of a proper name determines <em>which individual it refers to</em>, but at most only what sort of individual its referent is; for it is this that determines which criterion of identity is associated with the name. </li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>Replacement for <a name="7"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3419.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Individuals, Sorts, and Instantiation</A>".<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P21745_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21745_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: <FONT COLOR = "800080">I am thinking, primarily, of the view made famous by <a name="10"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_441.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity</A>".</FONT> <a name="On-Page_Link_P21745_6"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21745_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: <FONT COLOR = "800080">In <a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_366.htm">Searle (John) - Proper Names</A>", 1958. </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:41" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:41:45</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>