<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Lowe (E.J.) - Parts and Wholes (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21749.htm">Parts and Wholes</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/L/Author_Lowe (E.J.).htm">Lowe (E.J.)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Lowe (E.J.) - More Kinds of Being: Chapter 7</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21749.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperCitings_21749.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PapersToNotes_21749.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Introduction</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>It is often said that certain 'wholes' are 'greater than the sum of their parts'. Since it is not entirely clear what 'greater than' is supposed to mean in this context, I would prefer simply to say that some wholes are <em>distinct from</em> the sum of their parts - or, more accurately, distinct from <em>any</em> sum of their <em>proper</em> parts, since we may need to allow that there is more than one way of individuating a thing's 'parts' and hence, perhaps, no such thing as <em>the</em> sum of its parts. </li><li>But this is not true, it seems, of <em>all</em> wholes. By a 'whole', I should explain, I just mean a thing which <em>has</em> proper parts, or is 'composite', and I shall restrict my attention almost entirely to <em>concrete</em> wholes. (Henceforth, I shall drop the qualification 'proper' to avoid prolixity and so should be understood to be using the term 'part' in a sense in which it is not the case that any thing is, trivially, a part of itself.) </li><li>I shall begin by defending the claims that I have just made. Later. I shall go on to examine their implications for the views of certain other philosophers, in particular those who adhere to a relativist conception at identity. </li><li>Consider again our old friend, <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1169.htm">Tibbles the cat</A><SUP>1</SUP>. <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1169.htm">Tibbles</A><SUP>2</SUP> is a composite thing: he certainly has parts. <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1169.htm">Tibbles</A><SUP>3</SUP>'s tail - call it 'Tail' - is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21749_4">a part of Tibbles</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21749_4"></A>. But is there an object which is, so to speak, <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1169.htm">Tibbles</A><SUP>5</SUP> minus Tail? I rather think there is and that this object is also a part of <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1169.htm">Tibbles</A><SUP>6</SUP>, albeit a very large part. & </li></ol></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>See <a name="6"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3422.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Parts and Wholes</A>" for an earlier attempt.<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P21749_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21749_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>Some philosophers, notably Peter van Inwagen, would deny this: see <a name="7"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2010.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts</A>" (1981), pp. 123-37, and <a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_49.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings</A>" (1990). </li><li>However, this is certainly a counter-intuitive opinion, which I think we should eschew if the common-sense view of the matter can be defended, as I believe it can.</li></ul></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:41" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:41:48</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>