Intelligence in the Flesh - Limbering Up: An Introduction
Claxton (Guy)
Source: Claxton (Guy) - Intelligence in the Flesh: Chapter 1
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  1. If the body had been easier to understand, nobody would have thought that we had a mind.
    "Rorty (Richard) - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature", 1981, p. 239.
  2. Over the last century, human beings in affluent societies have become more and more sluggish. Millions of us work in offices, pushing paper, staring at screens, discussing proposals and rearranging words and spreadsheets. For our leisure, we look at more screens, text and tweet, escape into virtual worlds, gossip and chatter. Some of us still play tennis or knit, but the drift is undeniably chair- and couch-wards. Our functional bodies have shrunk; just ears and eyes on the input side, and mouths and fingertips on the output side. Laundry now involves all the physical skill and effort of pushing clothes through a porthole and pushing a button. Cooking2 can be no more than ripping off a plastic film and closing the microwave door. Our real bodies get so little attention, and so little skilful use, that we have to make special arrangements to remember them: we program country walks and trips to the gym into our smartphones. Inactivity and cleanliness used to be the privilege of the rich3: not any more. And the machines that make all this leisure possible are opaque - most of us wouldn't know how to fix them4, and wouldn't want to. We have become mind rich and body poor5.
  3. But this is not another panicky book about obesity, heart disease or the dangers of the internet. Nor is it a hymn of nostalgia for the dying arts of quilting and whittling. At the heart of this book is an argument; that we neglect our bodies because we underestimate their intelligence6. The problem is not that we have become 'lazy', or devoid of 'willpower'. It is a matter of assumptions and values. We aspire to cerebral jobs and disembodied pastimes because we have got the idea that those kinds of things require more intelligence7 than practical, physical things, and consequently they are more highly esteemed8 in our societies. Crudely, they make us look smarter, and looking smart is good, so doing mind stuff makes us feel good. (Of course, because they are more highly esteemed, they also, by and large, pay more.) Conversely (with a few possible exceptions such as some top athletes) being physically tired, dirty and smelly is associated with a lack of intelligence9. So we learn to aspire to being clean and verbal10.
  4. We still think about the relative intelligence11 of body and mind in an archaic and inaccurate way: so says the new science of embodied cognition. Many neuroscientists do not now think that intelligence12 belongs only to minds, and that the pinnacle of human intelligence13 is rational argument14. They no longer believe that the mind is an ethereal source of control, sent to curb the body's waywardness and compensate for its stupidity. They do not think that minds and bodies are different kinds of stuff. The idea that bodies are dumb vehicles and minds are smart drivers is old hat15. The new science of embodiment has important implications for how we think about ourselves and how we live our lives. This book is a shot at getting that knowledge out there - because I think it matters a lot.
  5. The predominant association of intelligence16 with thinking and reasoning isn't fact; it is a cultural belief - a virulent meme, some would call it - that misdirects us. Young people who prefer doing intricate things with their bodies - breakdancing, skateboarding - to doing their maths homework are not lacking in intelligence17. I think they are part of a growing cultural rebellion against the hegemony of the intellect (though most of them wouldn't put it quite like that). I hope this book will help their parents and teachers understand why that rebellion is itself intelligent. I hope it might contribute to a wider revaluing of the practical and physical, in education for example, so that those who are not cerebrally inclined18 will not be led to make the mistake of feeling stupid.

  6. Let me, in this overture, introduce some of the main themes that will emerge as the scientific story unfolds.
  7. The recurring motif is this: we do not have bodies; we are bodies. If my body was different, I would be different. If I was made of silicon19 or fibre optics, I would need different things, respond to different things, notice different things, and be intelligent in a different kind of way. My mind was not parachuted in to save and supervise some otherwise helpless concoction of dumb meat. No, it's just the other way round: my intelligent flesh has evolved, as part of its intelligence20, strategies and capacities that I think of as my 'mind'. I am smart precisely because I am a body. I don't own it or inhabit it; from it, I arise21.
  8. This realisation is both completely mundane - and quite extraordinary. It overturns the accepted, intuitive psychology - academics call it the 'folk psychology' - of two thousand years of Western civilisation. Chapter 2 ("Claxton (Guy) - A Brief History of Anti-Bodies") sets the scene for the new view …
  9. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 take us into the modern, scientific understanding of the body:-
  10. This being so, we need to rethink the relationship between thoughts and feelings. Feelings are not a nuisance. They are not - as Plato thought, and many still do - wayward and primitive urgings that continually threaten to undermine the fragile structures built by dispassionate reason. They are, as we will see in Chapter 6 ("Claxton (Guy) - Emotions and Feelings"), the bodily glue that sticks our reasoning and our common sense together.
  11. Language and reason themselves look different when we see that they too are rooted in the body. Chapter 7 ("Claxton (Guy) - The Embodied Mind") explores the ways in which our more abstract understanding grows out of the physical and sensory concepts that the young child grasps first …
  12. Much of our somatic intelligence22 operates unconsciously, without conscious supervision or even awareness. So what is consciousness for, and how does it emerge from the intrinsic activities of a complicated body? In Chapter 8 ("Claxton (Guy) - The Welling Up of Consciousness") I'll suggest that conscious thoughts and images are actually the result of a progressive (though often quite rapid) process of unfurling meanings and decisions that have their origins in the darker, deeper, more visceral areas of the brain and body.
  13. Bodies do not stop at the skin. So neither do minds. We'll see in Chapter 9 ("Claxton (Guy) - The Augmented Body") that the internal streaming of information continues through our fingertips and out into the tools we use, for example.
  14. The fact that we are fundamentally doers means we are also inveterate makers. Making is doing that involves those extraordinarily sophisticated on-board tools, our hands. In Chapter 10 ("Claxton (Guy) - Craftiness and Expertise") we will find that human intelligence23 lives in our hands just as much as in our tongues and our brains.
  15. So, with all this in mind (and body), we will come back to the question: what does it really mean to be intelligent? A lot has been written in the last twenty years about different kinds of intelligence24. We have had emotional intelligence25, practical intelligence26 and 'bodily-kinaesthetic' intelligence27, along with a host of others. But I'm not proposing another kind of intelligence28 to add to the list. My contention here is more radical than that. It is that practical, embodied intelligence29 is the deepest, oldest, most fundamental and most important intelligence30 of the lot; and the others are aspects or outgrowths of this basic, bodily capability. Emotional intelligence31 is an aspect of bodily intelligence32. Mathematical intelligence33 is a development of bodily intelligence34. There is a world of difference between human intelligence35, properly understood, and mere cleverness36.
  16. In the real world, intelligence37 refers to the optimal functioning of the eco-socio-embodied systems that we are. Intelligence38 isn't a faculty; it is the behaviour of an entire system when it is able to come up with good answers to the perennial question: What's the best thing to do next? Intelligence39 is reconciling desires, possibilities and capabilities in real time - especially when the situation is complex, novel or unclear. The ability to figure out the next number in the sequence 1,2,3,5,8, ... is a very poor proxy40 for your ability to act wisely when you lose your wallet41 or when you get a great job offer that would mean uprooting the family. At such times you need to be able to analyse the situation, check your values and assumptions, and figure out the consequences42 of various courses of action. In times of change or challenge you need your reason - but you also need your ability to sense inwardly what is truly in your own best and deepest interests. And a lot of clever people can’t do that43. I don't think they teach it (yet) at Harvard Business School.
  17. Which obviously leads us on to the question of how you do 'teach' it, and that is the business of Chapter 11 ("Claxton (Guy) - Rehab: How Can I Get My Body Back?").
  18. Finally in Chapter 12 ("Claxton (Guy) - The Embodied Life: Self, Spirit and Society") we will round up the implications of embodiment both for individual well-being and for the nature of the over-intellectualised, somatically impoverished institutions that surround us.

  19. In a way, this book is the third (and probably last) in a trilogy which began in 1997 with my book "Claxton (Guy) - Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind: How Intelligence Increases When You Think Less". There, I was one of the first to argue, on the basis of scientific research, that much human intelligence44 depends on processes of which we are not - and largely cannot be - aware. I called it 'the under-mind'. It is now also widely known as the adaptive or cognitive unconscious.
  20. Then in 2005 I wrote a sequel. "Claxton (Guy) - The Wayward Mind: An Intimate History of the Unconscious", aiming to situate this new 'unconscious' within a wider cultural and historical context. I brought together the kinds of stories that societies since about 4000 BC have created to try and account for mental phenomena that seem to be at odds with 'common sense': hypnosis, hallucination, mental illness and creative inspiration, for example.
    1. Perhaps they arise from the external influences of gods, demons and spirits.
    2. Or maybe they spring from the 'subconscious', a dark inner maelstrom of whimsy and wildness (as Plato thought, long before Freud).
    3. Or was the source simply activity in the matter of which we were made, that just sometimes failed to conform to normal expectations - an excess of 'black bile', maybe?
  21. I showed that versions of these three stories recur and compete throughout human history, right up to the present day. I argued that each has its value, and its pitfalls. Stories can be useful even if (or precisely because) they do not refer to objectively verifiable things.
  22. But with the rise of affective neuroscience and embodied cognition we are now able to offer much more robust and compelling versions of the third story. At my most radical, I would now claim that, not only are 'the gods and spirits' non-existent (even though they may still have their uses), but the unconscious is dead too. We may choose to continue using it as a metaphorical or poetic way of talking, but thar ain't no such animal. There are myriad processes in the body that never lead to conscious experience, but there is no real, identifiable place or agent inside us that is a separate source of impetus from consciousness and reason. Like 'the mind', 'the unconscious' is a place-saver, a dummy explanation. It is like a temporary filling in a tooth, put there till something better comes along. And now it has.

  23. I should say a little about my style and source material. I have read hundreds of research papers, but a good deal of this primary material is quite technical and even arcane. I have tried to dig out the main points and present them in an accessible and palatable way; to walk a middle path between respecting the rigour and niceties of research and telling a good story. But this means I will inevitably have skated over many points of contention that my more learned academic colleagues rightly consider to be important. The so-called 'hard problem' of consciousness will have to wait for another day45, as, very largely, will the relationship between what I have to say here and other important work on what are called Systems One and Two (or, in Daniel Kahneman's terms, fast and slow46 thinking). Sorry, guys.
  24. I have also glossed over several topics you may reasonably have expected would receive better treatment in such a book.
    1. I'll say nothing about the difference between male and female bodies, or the difference between men's and women's relationship to their bodies.
    2. Issues of physical and mental health remain largely unexplored, and what used to be called 'psychosomatic' conditions have not got anything like the attention they deserve.
    3. Neither have traditional understandings of the body-mind such as those found in many indigenous cultures, notably the traditional Chinese, Indian and Native American. I now suspect that these systems of thought, and others like them, are intricate blends of real insight and hocus-pocus, but it would take a whole book to disentangle one from t'other, and there isn't room here even to begin to make a start. (Can I feel a quartet47 coming on?)
  25. As well as the primary sources, I must gratefully acknowledge several overviews of the new science of embodied cognition on which I have drawn, sometimes extensively. They include:-
  26. I have pilfered part of my title from "Lakoff (George) & Johnson (Mark) - Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought", and many ideas from "Damasio (Antonio) - Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain" and Antonio Damasio's Self Comes to Mind.
  27. I am acutely aware that, in writing this book, I am standing on the shoulders of giants, and the above authors are some of them. Most of these books are quite technical, however, both scientifically and philosophically, and they often delve into academic disputes of limited interest (and accessibility) to non-specialists or people new to the field.
  28. There are also three excellent recent books on craft and practical intelligence48 that I want to mention as well:-
    • Matthew Crawford's The Case for Working with Your Hands,
    • Richard Sennett's The Craftsman, and
    • Mike Rose's The Mind at Work.
    None of these, though, situates the renewed interest in physical making within the emerging science of embodied cognition. For those who want to dig deeper, any of these books would make excellent reading. However, none of them has - for good or ill - the sweep of mine, attempting to embrace visceral physiology, brain science, the function of emotion, consciousness, craftsmanship and 'handiness', as well as the wider social and personal implications of the new science for our view of human intelligence49. I hope the breadth will prove interesting, even if some of the depth has had to be sacrificed.
  29. Well, that's quite enough throat-clearing. Let's get on with it. We'll start with a quick look at how the separation of mind and body, and the privileging of one over the other, came about.

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Chapter summaries have been extracted and moved to form Abstracts for the corresponding Chapters.

Footnote 2: By the number of cookery programs on TV, it’s as though cookery has become the new leisure sport – but I suppose most people watch – as they do football – rather than “play”.

Footnote 3: They always had their sport – especially hunting. And gentlewomen used to sew.

Footnote 4: Footnote 5: Footnote 8: Footnote 10: Footnote 14: Footnote 15: Not even Descartes thought of the mind as the captain of the ship – he thought of mind and body as more “intermingled”. See "Descartes (Rene) - Sixth Meditation".

Footnote 18: Footnote 21: Footnote 36: So, he would not be a fan of “wit” then?

Footnote 40: Footnote 41: I imagine that most people figure out what to do, especially those who score well on IQ tests.

Footnote 42: Footnote 43: Footnote 45: No doubt, but as it’s “hard” I doubt Claxton will have anything sensible to say about it.

Footnote 46: Footnote 47:

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