<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Anders (Paul C.) - Material Being and the Survival of Death: A Dilemma for the Religiously Oriented Materialist (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21946.htm">Material Being and the Survival of Death: A Dilemma for the Religiously Oriented Materialist</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/A/Author_Anders (Paul C.).htm">Anders (Paul C.)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Society of Christian Philosophers, Pacific Regional Meeting: Feb. 16-18, 2006</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21946.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PapersToNotes_21946.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s Abstract</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>The nature of (human) persons has become an issue at the forefront of the debate between religion and a modern scientific worldview. Contemporary philosophy of mind is decidedly physicalistic in its approach. Some religiously oriented philosophers have sought to show some conceptual unification between religious doctrine and physicalist philosophy of mind.</li><li> One of the central doctrines of many religious systems is that human persons survive death. After considering a standard objection to many types of materialist accounts of human persons, I focus my discussion on <a name="3"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/v/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A> s proposed material ontology of human persons and how his position relates to the doctrine of <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>1</SUP>. </li><li>I find van Inwagen s proposal does not fall to this standard objection. However, van Inwagen s attempt to show his materialism and the doctrine of the <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">survival of death</A><SUP>2</SUP> consistent makes clear the necessary falsehood of his material ontology regarding human persons. </li><li>This result suggests a serious dilemma for the religiously oriented materialist regarding persons. </li></ul></FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>For the paper, see <a name="W3758W"></a><A HREF = "https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/postgraduate/postgraduate-research/pgr-students/thom-atkinson/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:44" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:44:45</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>