Surviving Resurrection
Buckareff (Andrei A.) & Van Wagenen (Joel S.)
Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 67, No. 3 (June 2010), pp. 123-139
Paper - Abstract

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Authors’ Abstract

  1. In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view1 of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker.
  2. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view2 given the account of personal identity it assumes.
  3. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View". We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable.
  4. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view3 of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified.

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