- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Twinning1' during my Thesis research, as from end October 2016.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Statistics" above.
Write-up2 (as at 17/08/2018 17:35:31): Twinning
- There are two forms of twinning:-
- Dizygotic twinning (Wikipedia: Dizygotic Twins), wherein two separately-fertilized eggs simultaneously develop (to term), is uninteresting from the perspective of my thesis.
- Monozygotic Twinning (Wikipedia: Monozygotic Twins) wherein a single fertilised egg splits into two separately-developing fetuses is a special case of Fission4.
- Monozygotic Twinning is an important factor – modally even when there is no twinning in fact – in the topic of Personal Identity.
- The possibility of monozygotic twinning is said to be the reason why no existing individual can be numerically identical to an earlier zygote.
- A zygote is capable of fissioning into two qualitatively identical, but numerically distinct daughter zygotes.
- So, a particular zygote has the modal property of developing into two monozygotic twins.
- Given that it cannot be identical to both5 of them, it cannot be identical to either (given that they are exactly similar there is no reason why one should be its closest continuer6 rather than the other).
- Conjoined-twinning would appear to be a case of fusion7 (maybe with prior fission8). This case will also be touched under the Note on Dicephalus9, which is the most extreme case of conjoined twinning.
- There is consequently some overlap between this Note, and its reading-list, and:-
→ Fusion11, and
- The “twin paradox” in Special Relativity will be covered – if at all – under the Note on Time13.
- For a page of Links14 to this Note, Click here. To restrict the number of irrelevancies, this list excludes “twin”.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read15, include16 the following:-
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Embryos and StemCell Research", Baker
- "Feldman (Fred) - The Enigma of Death", Feldman
- "Kazez (Jean) - Life Doesn't Begin at Conception", Kazez
- "Kazez (Jean) - The Philosophical Parent: Asking the Hard Questions About Having and Raising Children", Kazez
- "Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?", Lockwood, 1987
- "Howsepian (A.A.) - Lockwood on human identity and the primitive streak", Howsepian
- "Howsepian (A.A.) - Who or What Are We?", Howsepian
- "Shoemaker (David) - Personal Identity, Rational Anticipation, and Self-Concern", Shoemaker
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere might start with:-
- "Barilan (Y. Michael) - One or Two: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins from Malta", Barilan, 2003
- "Brill (H. Skott) - The Future-Like-Ours Argument, Personal Identity, and the Twinning Dilemma", Brill
- "Campbell (Tim) & McMahan (Jeff) - Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning", Campbell & McMahan, 2010
- "Ford (Norman) - Implantation and the Beginning of a Human Individual", Ford, 1988
- "Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity", Koch-Hershenov, 2006
- "Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Totipotency, Twinning, and Ensoulment at Fertilization", Koch-Hershenov, 2006
- "Olson (Eric) - The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twining", Olson, 2014
- "Savitt (Steven) - Notes on Adams 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity'", Savitt
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Brown-Brownson Revisited", Shoemaker
- "Smith (Barry) & Brogaard (Berit) - Sixteen Days", Smith & Brogaard, 2003
→ "Damschen (Gregor), Gomez-Lobo (Alfonso) & Schonecker (Dieter) - Sixteen Days? A Reply to B. Smith and B. Brogaard on the Beginning of Human Individuals", Damschen et al, 2003
- "Steinhart (Eric) - Indiscernible Persons", Steinhart
- "Tollefsen (Christopher) - Embryos, Individuals, and Persons: An Argument Against Embryo Creation and Research", Tollefsen
- This is mostly a place-holder17.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (17/08/2018 17:35:31).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 5: See the Logic of Identity.
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- If only a “non-updating” run has been made, the links are only one-way – ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven’t yet been confirmed as relevant.
- Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the “Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note” and “Summary of Note Links to this Page” sections) are to the “point of link” within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the “links page” remain generic.
- There are two sorts of updating runs – for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019