The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events
Campbell (Scott)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Sep., 2006), pp. 339-358
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Author’s Abstract

  1. It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion1 of personal identity, such as Derek Parfit and Sydney Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states.
  2. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist2' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the conception of a person that most psychological theorists favour, the constitution view3.
  3. It is also argued that the series view allows that people can body swap and teleport4, which the constitution view5 - which takes a person to be a physical object (but a distinct physical object from the human being) - has great trouble with.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Feb 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page