Strawson, Parfit and Impersonality
Campbell (Scott)
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 207-223
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer


Author’s Introduction

  1. It is thought by some philosophers that certain arguments developed by Peter Strawson in "Strawson (Peter) - Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics" show that Derek Parfit1's claim in "Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons" that experiences can be referred to without referring to persons is incoherent.
  2. In this paper I argue that Parfit2's claim is not threatened by these arguments.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Sept 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page