- Jaegwon Kim argues that weak and global supervenience1 are too weak to guarantee any sort of dependency. Of the three original forms of supervenience2, strong, weak, and global, each commonly wielded across all branches of philosophy, two are thus cast aside as uninteresting or useless. His arguments, however, fail to appreciate the strength of weak and global supervenience3.
- I investigate what weak and global supervenience4 relations are functionally and how they relate to strong supervenience5. For a large class of properties, weak and global supervenience6 are equivalent to strong supervenience7.
- I then offer a series of arguments showing that it is precisely because of their strength, not their weakness, that both weak and global supervenience8 are useless in characterizing any dependencies of interest to philosophers.
For a draft, see Link.
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- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
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