Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts

Author’s Abstract

1. Can different material objects have the same parts at all times at which they exist?
2. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against the main argument to the contrary, the ‘Indiscernibility Argument’. According to this argument, the modal¹ supervenes² on the non-modal³, since, after all, the non-modal⁴ is what grounds the modal⁵; hence, it would be utterly mysterious if two objects sharing all parts had different essential properties.
3. The weakness of the argument becomes apparent once we understand how the modal⁶ is grounded in the non-modal⁷. By extending the ideas of combinatorialism so that we recombine haecceities⁸ as well as fundamental properties, we see how modal⁹ properties can be grounded in non-modal¹⁰ properties in a way that allows coincidence and yet also explains why there are differences in the modal¹¹ properties of coinciding objects.
4. Despite this, some de re modal¹² facts are not grounded in the non-modal¹³ but instead are brute. However, although we cannot explain why a particular object has the basic modal¹⁴ properties it has, we can explain a closely related, semantic fact and, comparing the facts we can’t explain to more familiar brute facts, we understand why there should be no better explanation.
5. As a result, we can see how coincidence is, after all, possible.