<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Merricks (Trenton) - The End of Counterpart Theory (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22037.htm">The End of Counterpart Theory</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/M/Author_Merricks (Trenton).htm">Merricks (Trenton)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 100, No. 10 (Oct., 2003), pp. 521-549</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22037.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Counterpart theory says roughly that, for any object O and any property F, O is possibly F if and only if O has a counterpart that is F. Moreover, O is essentially F if and only if all of O's counterparts are F. According to David Lewis, the theory's leading advocate, our counterparts are typically a lot like us. Lewis holds that I am possibly forty feet tall if and only if there is someone in a universe spatiotemporally isolated from ours  one of Lewis's "possible worlds"  who, though otherwise appropriately like me, is forty feet tall. </li><li>Many find counterpart theory attractive, but most reject Lewis's <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>1</SUP> realism. So most deny that we have flesh-and-blood counter-parts in unreachable but humanly inhabited universes. They insist, instead, that our counterparts are somehow "abstract." It is that sort of counterpart theory  the sort endorsed by virtually every counterpart theorist except for Lewis himself  that I shall argue is untenable. (Indeed, as we shall see, there are good reasons to reject any reduction of <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>2</SUP> properties to abstract worlds, counterpart-theoretic or other- wise.) Because I do not believe Lewis's ontology, I think his version of counterpart theory is also mistaken. And so  I conclude  we should reject every sort of counterpart theory.</li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:11" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:11:39</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>