Chisholm on Personal Identity
Smythe (Thomas W.)
Source: Philosophical Studies: Vol. 27, No. 5 (May, 1975), pp. 351-360
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. Roderick Chisholm has said that when we say of a physical thing that it is the same as, or identical with, a physical thing picked out as existing at some later time, we are using the expression 'the same as' or 'identical' in a 'loose and popular sense'; but when we say of a person existing at one time that he is the same as, or identical with, a person picked out as existing at a later time, we are using 'the same as' or 'identical' in a 'strict and philosophical sense1'.
  2. In this paper I shall argue that Chisholm is not successful in showing that there is a difference between personal identity and the identity of physical bodies in terms of the kinds of identity, or concept of identity involved.
  3. I will also point out some difficulties in Chisholm's distinction between the strict and loose senses of identity.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Chisholm's views on this distinction have been published in the following:
  1. "Chisholm (Roderick) & Shoemaker (Sydney) - Symposium: The Loose and Popular and the Strict and Philosophical Senses of Identity", 1969;
  2. "Chisholm (Roderick) - Identity Through Time", 1970;
  3. "Chisholm (Roderick) - Problems of Identity", 1971.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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