Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts

Author’s Introduction

1. Roderick Chisholm has said that when we say of a physical thing that it is the same as, or identical with, a physical thing picked out as existing at some later time, we are using the expression 'the same as' or 'identical' in a 'loose and popular¹ sense'; but when we say of a person existing at one time that he is the same as, or identical with, a person picked out as existing at a later time, we are using 'the same as' or 'identical' in a 'strict and philosophical sense₂'.
2. In this paper I shall argue that Chisholm is not successful in showing that there is a difference between personal identity and the identity of physical bodies in terms of the kinds of identity, or concept of identity involved.
3. I will also point out some difficulties in Chisholm's distinction between the strict and loose senses of identity.