Ethics and the Generous Ontology
Olson (Eric)
Source: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (special issue: Personal Identity and Bioethics), 2010: 259–270
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. According to a view attractive to both metaphysicians and ethicists, every period in a person’s life is the life of a being just like that person except that it exists only during that period.
  2. These ‘subpeople1’ appear to have moral status, and their interests seem to clash with ours: though it may be in some person’s interests to sacrifice for tomorrow, it is not in the interests of a subperson coinciding with him only today, who will never benefit from it. Or perhaps there is no clash, and a subperson’s interests derive from those of the person it coincides with.
  3. But this makes it likely that our own interests derive from those of other beings coinciding with us.

Comment:

See Olson - Ethics and the Generous Ontology.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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