Ethics and the Generous Ontology
Olson (Eric)
Source: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (special issue: Personal Identity and Bioethics), 2010: 259–270
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. According to a view attractive to both metaphysicians and ethicists, every period in a person’s life is the life of a being just like that person except that it exists only during that period.
  2. These ‘subpeople1’ appear to have moral status, and their interests seem to clash with ours: though it may be in some person’s interests to sacrifice for tomorrow, it is not in the interests of a subperson coinciding with him only today, who will never benefit from it. Or perhaps there is no clash, and a subperson’s interests derive from those of the person it coincides with.
  3. But this makes it likely that our own interests derive from those of other beings coinciding with us.


See Olson - Ethics and the Generous Ontology.

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
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