<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Shoemaker (David) - The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22080.htm">The Stony Metaphysical Heart of Animalism</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Shoemaker (David).htm">Shoemaker (David)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Blatti & Snowdon - Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity, 2016: Part III, Chapter 15, pp. 303-327</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PaperSummary_22080.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_22/PapersToNotes_22080.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Author s Introduction</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li><a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>1</SUP>, by the forthright acknowledgment of many of its own adherents, does poorly at accounting for our identity-related practical concerns. The reason is straightforward: whereas our practical concerns seem to track the identity of psychological creatures  persons  <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>2</SUP> focuses on the identity of human organisms who are not essentially persons. This lack of fit between our practical concerns and <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>3</SUP> may thus be taken to pose the following serious <em>Challenge</em> to <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_112.htm">animalism</A><SUP>4</SUP>: <ol type="i"><li><a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>5</SUP> lacks the proper fit with the set of our practical concerns; </li><li>If a theory of personal identity lacks the proper fit with the set of our practical concerns, it suffers a loss in plausibility; thus, </li><li><a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>6</SUP> suffers a loss in plausibility (in particular to psychological criteria of identity). </ol></li><li>There are two very general replies to Challenge. <ul type="disc"><li>First, one might deny (i), showing that <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>7</SUP> doesn't in fact lack the proper fit with our practical concerns. One might tack this response in one of two directions: either <ol type="a"><li>Appeal to the fact that animal continuity is at least a <em>necessary</em> condition for instantiation of the relevant (psychologically grounded) practical concerns (and so is sufficient for delivering a "proper fit"), </li><li>Show that our understanding of the relevant practical concerns is overly narrow and that our person-related practical concerns may actually define the "persons" to whom they apply in much broader  humanesque  terms, such that the theory of identity that fits best with them in the end is actually, surprisingly, <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>8</SUP>. </ol></li><li>The second general response to <em>Challenge</em> is to deny (ii), showing instead how a lack of fit with our practical concerns is not a plausibility condition for theories of personal identity. </li></ul></li><li>What we have, then, are actually three attempted responses to <em>Challenge</em>, and these may be drawn from the work of, respectively, <BR>&rarr; <a name="26"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/D/Author_DeGrazia (David).htm">David DeGrazia</A>, <BR>&rarr; <a name="27"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Schechtman (Marya).htm">Marya Schechtman</A>, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="28"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A>. </li><li>It is my first aim in this chapter to explain and evaluate them. <ol type="i"><li>I will find the first two responses problematic and the third, while on the right track, to be significantly incomplete. </li><li>I will then attempt to fill in the gaps of the third response to render it viable. </li><li>In doing so, I will show that and how our practical concerns do not consist in a monolithic set; rather, there are distinctly different <em>types</em> of practical concerns, and while some are clearly grounded on psychological relations, some are actually grounded on others, including <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalistic</A><SUP>9</SUP> and humanistic relations; furthermore, their actual connection to identity is tenuous at best. </li><li>What these concerns are, how they divide up, and what they are grounded on in each instance  these are the issues it is my second aim in this chapter to take up. </ol></li><li>I begin with a more thorough explication of <em>Challenge</em>. </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li>Challenge</li><li>Accounting for our Practical Concerns, 1.0: DeGrazia s Realism</li><li>Accounting for our Practical Concerns, 2.0: Schechtman s Expanded Persons</li><li>Divorcing <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>10</SUP> from Our Practical Concerns: Olson and <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplants</A><SUP>11</SUP></li><li>The Pluralism of the Practical </li></ol></FONT><BR><U><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22080_12">Editors Introduction</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22080_12"></A></U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Like <a name="24"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22079.htm">Johansson (Jens) - Animal Ethics</A>", David Shoemaker is also concerned with <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>13</SUP>'s normative import. In Chapter 15, he addresses <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>14</SUP>'s apparent inability to account for the practical concerns of human persons. Shoemaker formulates this objection as an argument against the plausibility of <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>15</SUP>, as follows: <ol type="i"><li>'<a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_112.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>16</SUP> lacks the proper fit with the set of our practical concerns; </li><li>If a theory of personal identity lacks the proper fit with the set of our practical concerns, it suffers a loss in plausibility; thus, </li><li><a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_112.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>17</SUP> suffers a loss in plausibility (in particular to psychological criteria of identity)'</ol></li><li>In response to this objection  which he labels 'Challenge'  Shoemaker considers three possible replies, each of which is extrapolated from recent work by <BR>&rarr; <a name="30"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1385.htm">DeGrazia (David) - Human Identity and Bioethics</A>", 2005, <BR>&rarr; <a name="29"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Schechtman (Marya).htm">Marya Schechtman</A>, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P22080_18">2010</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P22080_18"></A>, and <BR>&rarr; <a name="31"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>", 1997. </li><li>According to Shoemaker, both DeGrazia and Schechtman would reply to Challenge denying (i). <ol type="a"><li>In DeGrazia's case, (i) is rejected on the grounds that, as far as what is known about the actual world, the persistence of <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>19</SUP> is at least a necessary condition for the possession of those psychological characteristics which, in turn, ground such practical concerns as moral responsibility, prudential concern, and the like. By DeGrazia's lights, this fact is enough to block the inference to (iii)  i.e. to present <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>20</SUP> from suffering any loss in plausibility. </li><li>Schechtman too would contend <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>21</SUP> is perfectly capable of accounting for the practical concerns of human persons. But on her view, the route to (i)'s rejection is more ambitious, involving appeal to an expansive notion of personhood  what she calls a 'person-life'  which 'incorporate[s] the metaphysical insights of <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>22</SUP> in a way that allows that theory to produce the desired practical implications'. </ol></li><li>Ultimately, however, Shoemaker finds that neither DeGrazia's nor Schechtman's denials of (i) result in what an adequate response to Challenge really demands, which is an explanation of the justificatory role played by identity <em>qua</em> necessary condition for our practical concerns, where that explanation is both robust and informative (in senses that Shoemaker describes). </li><li>More promising, Shoemaker argues, is Olson's reply to Challenge, which involves denying not (i), but (ii). According to Olson, the intuition many of us report concerning familiar <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain-transplant</A><SUP>23</SUP> scenarios  i.e. that persons go where their psychological-continuity-preserving organs go  may not track any particular theory of personal identity, but only our practical concerns. And in that case, <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>24</SUP> may be true regardless of its failure to explain adequately our practical concerns. </li><li>But as Shoemaker points out, even if Olson is correct that the <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>25</SUP> intuition may reflect only our practical concerns and thus can be divorced from any particular account of personal identity, it does not follow that the plausibility of a theory of personal identity is not impacted by the degree to which it jibes with our practical concerns. As a result, Olson s attack on (ii) is not sufficiently strong. On Shoemaker s view, what is required in order to undermine (ii)  and, thereby, to block the inference to (iii)  is a defence of the claim that 'none of the relations or elements in which numerical identity consists matter, so that the correct theory of personal identity will contain nothing of relevance to our practical concerns'. This is precisely the claim that Shoemaker proceeds to defend in the concluding section of the chapter  what he calls the 'Identity Really <em>Really</em> Doesn't Matter View.' </li></ol></FONT><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P22080_12"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22080_12"><B>Footnote 12</B></A></U>: Taken from <a name="25"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22071.htm">Blatti (Stephan) & Snowdon (Paul), Eds - Animalism: Introduction</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P22080_18"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P22080_18"><B>Footnote 18</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li> Personhood and the Practical , Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics; August 2010, Vol. 31 Issue 4, p271</li><li>I don t have this paper. The abstract on EBSCOHost is as follows:-</li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Traditionally, it has been assumed that metaphysical and practical questions about personhood and personal identity are inherently linked. Neo-Lockean views that draw such a link have been problematic, leading to an opposing view that metaphysical and ethical questions about persons should be sharply distinguished. This paper argues that consideration of this issue suffers from an overly narrow conception of the practical concerns associated with persons that focuses on higher-order capacities and fails to appreciate basic practical concerns more directly connected to our animality. A more inclusive alternative is proposed. </FONT></li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T09:47" pubdate>02/08/2018 09:47:10</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>