Bermúdez on Self-Consciousness
Garrett (Brian)
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 53, No. 210 (Jan., 2003), pp. 96-101
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. I argue that Jose Luis Bermidez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness1.
  2. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness2, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant.
  3. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical.
  4. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness3 and 'I'-thoughts.

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