- This pseudo-Paper is intended as the mechanism to record time spent on the Note 'Embryo1' during my Thesis research, as from end October 2016.
- For the actual time recorded, click on "Paper Summary" above.
Write-up2 (as at 14/07/2018 00:23:02): Embryo
- In humans, the immediate post-fertilization product – the zygote4 – develops by division until it implants as the embryo (Wikipedia: Embryo). Until then it is called a proembryo (Wikipedia: Proembryo); a morula (Wikipedia: Morula) after 4 divisions – 16 blastomeres – and a blastocyst (Wikipedia: Blastocyst) by the 5th day. The implanted embryo is called a fetus (Wikipedia: Fetus) after 11 weeks.
- In the philosophy of personal identity, the question arises when the human being5 or the human person6 arises. Additionally – and relatedly – was I ever an embryo (or a zygote7, or a fetus8).
- Most philosophers agree that an embryo isn’t a person9, because it does not possess the appropriate psychological attributes.
- Many philosophers contend that a human embryo isn’t a human being either – in that it hasn’t the appropriate set of organs.
- In addition, the question whether I was ever an embryo is complicated by differences over the definition – or maybe ontological category – of “person”. Some philosophers insist that an individual can be a person on account of its expected future properties, or actual or once anticipated past properties, irrespective of its present capacities.
- There’s lots written in discussion of the ethical use of embryos that I will need to ignore unless it has metaphysical implications.
- There’s also a degree of overlap between this Note on Embryos with those on Zygotes10 and Fetuses11.
- For a page of Links12 to this Note, Click here. Unfortunately, there are too many to take advantage of at this stage.
- Works on this topic that I’ve actually read13, include14 the following:-
- "Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Embryos and Final Causes", Anscombe
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Embryos and StemCell Research", Baker, 2006
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End?", Baker, 2005
- "Kazez (Jean) - Life Doesn't Begin at Conception", Kazez
- "Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?", Lockwood, 1986
- "Shoemaker (David) - Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension", Shoemaker, 2005
- A reading list (where not covered elsewhere) might start with:-
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Does a Person Begin?", Baker, 2005
- "Cameron (Nigel M. de S.) - Embryos and Ethics: The Warnock Report in Debate", Cameron, 1987
- "CIBA Foundation - Human Embryo Research: Yes or No?", CIBA, 198615
- "Damschen (Gregor), Gomez-Lobo (Alfonso) & Schonecker (Dieter) - Sixteen Days? A Reply to B. Smith and B. Brogaard on the Beginning of Human Individuals", Damschen et al, 2006
- "Ford (Norman) - When Did I Begin: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science", Ford, 1988
- "Ghiselin (Michael) - Embryology as History and as Law", Ghiselin, 1997
- "Hershenov (David) - Embryos, Four-Dimensionalism and Moral Status", Hershenov, 2011
- "Hershenov (David) - Olson's Embryo Problem", Hershenov, 2002
- "Hershenov (David) - Perdure and Murder", Hershenov, 1986
- "Hershenov (David) & Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Anscombe on Embryos and Persons", Hershenov, 2016
- "Hershenov (David) & Taylor (Adam P.) - Dualism, Panpsychism, and the Bioethical Status of Brainless Embryos", Hershenov+Taylor
- "Oderberg (David) - The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Some Arguments Revisited", Oderberg, 2008
- "Smith (Barry) & Brogaard (Berit) - Sixteen Days", Smith, 2003
- "Tollefsen (Christopher) - Embryos, Individuals, and Persons: An Argument Against Embryo Creation and Research", Tollefsen, 2001
- "Warnock (Mary) - A Question of Life - The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology", Warnock, 1985
- This is mostly a place-holder16.
- This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (14/07/2018 00:23:02).
- Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
- A number of my philosophical Notes are “promissory notes” currently only listing the books and papers (if any) I possess on the topic concerned.
- I’ve decided to add some text – whether by way of motivation, or something more substantive – for all these identified topics related to my Thesis.
- As I want to do this fairly quickly, the text may be confused or show surprising ignorance.
- The reader (if such exists) will have to bear with me, and display the principle of charity while this footnote exists.
- If only a “non-updating” run has been made, the links are only one-way – ie. from the page of links to the objects that reference this Note by mentioning the appropriate key-word(s). The links are also only indicative, as they haven’t yet been confirmed as relevant.
- Once an updating run has been made, links are both ways, and links from this Notes page (from the “Authors, Books & Papers Citing this Note” and “Summary of Note Links to this Page” sections) are to the “point of link” within the page rather than to the page generically. Links from the “links page” remain generic.
- There are two sorts of updating runs – for Notes and other Objects. The reason for this is that Notes are archived, and too many archived versions would be created if this process were repeatedly run.
- Frequently I’ll have made copious marginal annotations, and sometimes have written up a review-note.
- In the former case, I intend to transfer the annotations into electronic form as soon as I can find the time.
- In the latter case, I will have remarked on the fact against the citation, and will integrate the comments into this Note in due course.
- My intention is to incorporate into these Notes comments on material I’ve already read rather than engage with unread material at this stage.
Footnote 15: See, in particular,
- I may have read others in between updates of this Note – in which case they will be marked as such in the “References and Reading List” below.
- Papers or Books partially read have a rough %age based on the time spent versus the time expected.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018