- In this essay I critically evaluate the ontological conception of what some embryologists are now calling the "human preembryo," as presently understood by Richard McCormick and Peter Van Inwagen.
- Both McCormick and van Inwagen imply that what is commonly referred to as the human preembryo could not be a human person. To wit, van Inwagen denies that there are any preembryos at all.
- Both of these philosophers base their conclusions primarily on the fact that, during the preembryonic gestational period, monozygotic twinning remains possible.
- I argue that given the conditions for being a person put forth by McCormick, and the conditions for being a composite material object suggested by van Inwagen, if what is commonly referred to as the human preembryo is neither a human person nor a material object, then neither are we.
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- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
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