- I argue for the thesis (UL) that there are certain logical abilities that any rational creature must have. Opposition to UL comes from naturalized epistemologists who hold that it is a purely empirical question which logical abilities a rational creature has.
- I provide arguments that any creatures meeting certain conditions – plausible necessary conditions on rationality – must have certain specific logical concepts and be able to use them in certain specific ways. For example, I argue that any creature able to grasp theories must have a concept of conjunction subject to the usual introduction and elimination rules.
- I also deal with disjunction1, conditionality and negation.
- Finally, I put UL to work in showing how it could be used to define a notion of logical obviousness that would be well suited to certain contexts – e.g. radical translation and epistemic logic – in which a concept of obviousness is often invoked.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)