|Evnine (Simon J.)|
|Source: Synthese, Vol. 118, No. 2 (1999), pp. 201-227|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Summary||Text Colour-Conventions|
(CP) If S is rational, then if S believes A and S believes B, then S believes A and B I shall argue in this paper that it should. To begin with, I shall defend (CP) against several criticisms that have been launched against it. These criticisms are of two kinds, which I shall call internal and external respectively. Internal objections are that a theory that includes (CP) fails to give an account of what it is rational to believe that is satisfactory by its own standards. In particular, since almost everyone agrees that belief in a contradiction is not rational, (CP) is criticized on the grounds that it would imply that beliefs in some contradictions are rational. External objections maintain that the degree of idealization in a theory including (CP) is so great as to make it irrelevant to various real-world phenomena to which a theory of rational belief should be relevant.
(NC) If S is rational, then S does not believe A and not-A. Unless otherwise stated, I shall assume that any theory of rational belief does contain such an injunction.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
|© Theo Todman, June 2007 - January 2018.||Please address any comments on this page to firstname.lastname@example.org.||File output: |
Website Maintenance Dashboard
|Return to Top of this Page||Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page||Return to Theo Todman's Home Page|