Putnam's Concept of Natural Kind Words and Frege's Doctrines of Sense, Reference, and Extension: Can They Cohere?
Wiggins (David)
Source: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Editors’ Abstract1

  1. (This essay, revised slightly) seeks to align Hilary Putnam's account of the semantics of natural kind terms with Frege's account of sense and reference. It defends and endorses the result.

Comment:

Originally in Meaning and Reference, ed. A.W. Moore, OUP, 1993



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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