The De Re 'Must', Individuative Essentialism, and the Necessity of Identity
Wiggins (David)
Source: Wiggins (David) - Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being, and Their Identity
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Editors’ Abstract1

  1. (This essay, partly new)reconsiders, among other things, Saul Kripke 's argument for the necessity of identity — this in the light of a variety of attacks by contingency theorists such as A.J. Ayer and W.V. Quine.
  2. My eagerness to defend that necessity amounts of course to a serious tribute to Quine's power and authority.

Comment:

Originally in Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans & J. McDowell, Clarendon Press, 1976



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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