What's next? Time travel and phenomenal continuity
Torrengo (Giuliano) & Buonomo (Valerio)
Source: Draft (final version in The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the metaphysics of personal identity over time (2018), V. Buonomo (ed.), Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: Editiones Scholasticae: pp. 184-201)
Paper - Abstract

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Authors’ Abstract

  1. In this paper we shall argue for the view that personal identity over time is constituted by continuity of phenomenology. Following recent terminology, we call this view the phenomenal account of personal persistence.
  2. In Section 2, we bring to the fore its main advantages and disadvantages.
  3. Section 3 will focus on a thought experiment1 involving identity over time in a time travel2 scenario, and
  4. In Section 4 we argue that the phenomenal account, unlike other mentalistic approaches, has the resources to cope with the thought experiment3, thereby offering an indirect argument in support of this view.
  5. Finally, in Section 5 we will deal with objections and replies.

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