The Logic of Epistemic Justification
Smith (Martin)
Source: Forthcoming (as of November 2017) in Peijnenburg, J. and Bewersdorf, B. eds. Epistemic Justification (Synthese special issue)
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases — predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles.
  2. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But these closure principles are only a small sample of the logical principles that we might consider.
  3. In this paper, I will outline four further logical principles that plausibly hold for justification and two which plausibly do not. While my primary aim is just to put these principles forward, I will use them to evaluate some different approaches to justification and (tentatively) conclude that a ‘normic’ theory of justification best captures its logic.

Comment:

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