A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces
Smith (Martin)
Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science v61(4), 2010
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Many epistemologists have responded to the lottery paradox by proposing formal rules according to which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. "Douven (Igor) & Williamson (Timothy) - Generalizing the Lottery Paradox" (2006) present an ingenious argument purporting to show that such rules invariably trivialise, in that they reduce to the claim that a probability of 1 warrants acceptance.
  2. Douven and Williamson’s argument does, however, rest upon significant assumptions – among them a relatively strong structural assumption to the effect that the underlying probability space is both finite and uniform.
  3. In this paper, I will show that something very like Douven and Williamson’s argument can in fact survive with much weaker structural assumptions – and, in particular, can apply to infinite probability spaces.

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