What Else Justification Could Be
Smith (Martin)
Source: Noûs v44(1), 2010, reprinted in Neta, R. ed. Epistemology (Routledge, 2012)
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

  1. According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought – if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be?
  2. In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference between ceteris paribus laws and brute statistical generalisations.
  3. I go on to discuss, in light of this suggestion, issues such as classical and lottery driven scepticism as well as the lottery and preface paradoxes.

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