|The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism|
|Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 891-897|
|Paper - Abstract|
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The extent to which different discourses manifest such features can be a matter of degree: the local constraints on the truth predicate can be stronger than minimal, but weaker than the kind that reflect industrial-strength realist commitments.
Footnote 1: Somewhat arbitrarily truncated!
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