Presentism and "Cross-Time" Relations
Crisp (Thomas M.)
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 5-17
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

  1. Presentists say that only present things exist. But their theory faces a well-known objection. Yesterday's downpour caused today's flood. So today's flood bears the is caused by relation to yesterday's downpour. But, one thinks, for a relation to hold between two things, both must exist. So it must not be the case that only present things exist, since yesterday's downpour is no longer present. So it must not be the case that presentism is true.
  2. Call this the objection from "cross-time" relations. This paper will argue that presentists have an adequate reply to the objection from cross-time relations. After explaining the objection in more detail, the paper considers several replies on offer in the literature, arguing that none is entirely adequate as it stands. Finally, a new reply is considered and defended against an objection.

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