The Logic of Essence
Fine (Kit)
Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 24, No. 3, Afterthoughts on Kaplan's Demonstratives (Jun., 1995), pp. 241-273
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. Central to this paper is a certain distinction. This is the distinction between objects simply having a property and their having that property essentially or by their very nature. Also central to the paper is a certain claim. This is the claim that the notion of essence, of objects essentially having a property, is not to be understood in terms of the notion of necessity.
  2. The claim is defended in my paper "Fine (Kit) - Essence and Modality".

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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