I may eventually break this book out into separate Papers – at least for the chapters I’m especially interested in. For now I just quote the Introduction, and add a few notes as necessary.
Introduction (Full Text)
- Having children turns every parent and parent-to-be into a philosopher. The philosophical questions are right there in the many perplexing situations we confront in the process of bringing new people into the world and then raising them. Fortunately, we're also in a position to spend some time thinking about these questions. Becoming and being a parent is full of waiting, which means we have time to muse, grapple, wonder, and discuss.
- There's waiting to get pregnant1 — why is it so important to become a parent? Waiting for morning sickness to end — why does nausea make all of life seem so dismal? Waiting for lab results — are there any problems that would make termination of a pregnancy2 a reasonable choice? And waiting for a fetus3 to become a baby — at what point has your child come into existence?
- Later, there's waiting for the crying to stop so you can leave for work — is it okay that you're going to work? Waiting at the park while your child plays — why is your child so beautiful and brilliant in your eyes, and should you try to be more objective? Waiting in doctors' offices — must you vaccinate, even if there's a tiny risk of a bad reaction? Waiting for one phase to end and another to begin — does your child remain the same child, through all the changes? And waiting for college admissions decisions — why do you care so much? And many other reasons to wait and to wonder.
- One of my favorite occasions for thought, over the nineteen years since my twins were born, has been The Performance, whether a talent show, a play, or a recital. Your kid is somewhere in the line-up, and there are twenty other acts to watch and applaud. Every child is charmingly gawky and innocent, and there are patches of true talent here and there. But these things can drag, so there's time to think. And also something interesting to think about. Can I go home after my own child performs? Or do I owe it to the parents who watched my child to stay and watch theirs? What social obligations do I incur by being a parent in a community?
- There's time to wonder and reflect, but not long stretches of time. The baby will wake up, the exercise class will end. You only have ten minutes to read at bedtime, before your eyes are going to close. So the chapters of this book are fairly short. Big problems are broken up into chewable morsels. Long stages of life for parents are broken up into series of shorter stages.
- The questions are arranged in chronological order, starting with three about why we want children and whether we're being good, bad, or neither by having them. Next is a question about controlling the sort of child we have — whether to be selective, or to accept whatever child comes our way. And then there are questions about pregnancy4, the fetus5, and birth. At long last, a child has been born, and there are some hard questions to ask about the basis for saying the child belongs to one prospective parent or another.
- Halfway through the book, we turn from questions about becoming parents to questions about being parents. Chapter 9 considers just what, precisely, parents do for their children — what the parenting job consists of. After that I tackle numerous questions about how we ought to treat our children: whether to circumcise a boy; when we may lie to children; how much to care about a child's gender; and to what extent we should pass on our own values and beliefs. There are also questions about what it means to be a socially responsible parent. Must we get involved with the PTA at our child's school? Do we have to go along with collective projects like vaccination?
- Finally, what do we get out of being parents? Happiness? Meaning? Or in fact a reduction in well-being, especially if we're not only parents but primary caregivers? And what should children give back to us, in return for being cared for over many years? We'll begin at the beginning. We affiliate with other people in all sorts of ways — friend to friend, spouse to spouse, brother to sister, teacher to student. What's so special about parent to child? And in the first place, what is it for another person to be my child.
Notes on Chapter 5: In the Beginning: What's going on in there?
- Was Larry Once an Embryo6?
- Very Early, Very Late
- Olson Vs. Baker
- The Very Beginning
- Pregnancy7 Loss
- "Baird (Robert M.) & Rosenbaum (Stuart E.), Eds. - The Ethics of Abortion: Pro-Life Vs. Pro-Choice", Baird & Rosenbaum9
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View", Baker
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Does a Person Begin?", Baker
- "Eliot (Lise) - What's Going On in There?: How the Brain And Mind Develop in the First Five Years of Life", Eliot
- "Ford (Norman) - When Did I Begin: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science", Ford
- "Koch (Cristof) - When Does Consciousness Arise in Human Babies?", Koch
- "Marquis (Don) - Why Abortion is Immoral", Marquis
- "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology", Olson
- "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology", Olson
- "Radest (Howard B.) - Biomedical Ethics: Humanist Perspectives", Radest10
- "Smith (Barry) & Brogaard (Berit) - Sixteen Days", Smith & Brogaard
- "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - A Defense of Abortion", Thomson
- The Visible Embryo
- Kazez claims to seek to avoid the “look ahead” analysis of the ontological status of the conceptus through fetus11 – and its relation to the future child – so that it doesn’t get entangled with the abortion12 debate. Pro-lifers and pro-choicers tend to “look ahead” and so distort the argument to fit lest they paint themselves into the opposite corner. Kazez hopes not to do this, and in any case thinks the ethics of abortion13 to be orthogonal to the ontological status of the fetus14.
- When Kazez reflects on her pregnancy15 with her twins, she tends to think of them as existing a long time before their birth, and as having been continuous with the tiny balls of cells “they once were”.
- But, she asks, could the very same entity go from being coffee-ground sized and primitive to being a 5-year-old? Yes, she says; nature is full of such dramatic changes: birds fledge, caterpillars metamorphose16 into butterflies17. Immature creatures become adults, we want to say.
- Isn’t the embryo18 just the extreme case of immaturity? And isn’t human birth at an arbitrary point in maturation, much earlier than ideal, necessitated by the exigencies of the birth process, given large head & narrow hips?
- Kazez contrasts a “very early” view supposedly held by Eric Olson with the “very late” view supposedly held by Lynne Rudder Baker. I’ve added these “supposedly’s” because the two philosophers differ radically on what we are19. Olson thinks we are (identical to) human animals20. Baker thinks we are (identical to or maybe “most fundamentally”) human persons. Both may agree when human animals21 begin, for all I know22.
- Kazez notes that Olson – in "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology" – holds the “very early” view not on ethical or religious grounds but because he thinks serious metaphysical perplexities arise otherwise.
- As far as the “very late” view is concerned, Kazez notes that some introduce “consciousness” as essential for our existence, but just when does it arise23? Kazez notes that a “fairly cautious24 assessment” would be that consciousness arises between 24 and 34 weeks, by which time normal brain waves (as measured by an EEG) arise – though even then the fetus25 spends most of its time asleep26. Anyone thinking that consciousness is essential to our existence thinks of us as essentially a conscious self27, not just an organism.
- Baker’s view – in "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View" – is that personhood is essential to us, and we don’t exist before or after we are persons28 – but what is personhood? Kazez’s brief exposition of Baker’s view is that a person must have at least a rudimentary First Person Perspective29 (consciousness, the ability to imitate and to have intentional states) and be on the way to having a full-blown FPP (reflectiveness, moral responsibility, reason and the like – that is in order to rule out30 non-human animals). Baker thinks human babies qualify as having a rudimentary FPP at birth, and since they are all on the way to a full-blown FPP, babies qualify as persons.
- Olson objects to Baker’s “very late view” by observing that it’s very odd that – while there’s a precursor to the person in the womb, something new pops into existence just when a rudimentary FPP arises.
- This might be the case if substance dualism31 were true and a soul32 was created and attached to the body around the time of birth. Unfortunately, Kazez points out, the “soul view33” is problematic for the usual reasons:
Kazez sees no good answers to these questions, and claims that there are almost no34 fans of souls amongst contemporary philosophers. Of course, as Kazez notes, Baker doesn’t support this view in any case.
- How do souls attach to bodies?
- How do souls interact with physical things?
- Where are souls prior to attachment?
- What are souls made of?
- Instead Baker thinks that as soon as a rudimentary FPS arises, the person comes into existence, being constituted35 by the organism. Kazez explains Baker’s position by her analogy between the statue and the clay36.
- Kazez expounds Olson’s position as the “simpler” view that the individual starts to exist very early on and later acquires the property37 of being a person, but with no ontological change. However, “simpler” isn’t necessarily “correct”, claims Baker, as it’d imply we are “merely” organisms, who just happen to be persons at stages of our lives, like we might be adults or lawyers. For Baker, personhood is an ontologically significant property – persons are always persons.
- Kazez isn’t troubled by38 the thought that she was once a non-person, just like she was once a non-mother. While we are animals, we are very special animals39. Anyway, we’re referred to Baker’s and Olson’s oeuvres for a more nuanced discussion.
- Kazez now turns to the question of just when the individual begins. Olson40 and Baker agree that conception is too early as the point the fetal organism begins to exist.
- This chapter now covers some of the same ground as "Kazez (Jean) - Life Doesn't Begin at Conception", though more briefly. She notes that Olson and “quite a few other philosophers” are convinced by "Ford (Norman) - When Did I Begin: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science", that we were never a zygote41, though this view “hasn’t entered the mainstream”. Kazez rehearses the twinning42 argument: in the case of actual twinning43 the logic of identity means that, while both twins44 have the zygote45 as a precursor, neither can be identical to it. For some reason46, Kazez just brushes this argument aside, rather than invoking the modal47 twinning48 argument. She then rehearses the argument of the paper just referenced49, with the same conclusion: we either began around day 4, and so once had (future) fetal support structures as proper parts, or around day 14 when cells had differentiated sufficiently to be purely fetal.
- What of miscarriages? Very early ones (prior to 4 or 14 days) merely dash hopes – a child-to-be isn’t lost, as it didn’t then exist. Kazez hasn’t the space to address the ontological implications of later miscarriages (or abortions50), other than to note that she posits that the organism “kicking at 18 weeks” is the child-to-be, rather than merely a fetal organism, but that it doesn’t have the attributes of the child – ie. it is not a self or a person.
- I couldn’t find all the references, and couldn’t be bothered to list those I’ve not been able to obtain. See the book.
- Contains the papers by Marquis and Thomson mentioned below.
- Contains “The Moral Status of the Human Embryo” by Berit Brogarrd, which discusses the twinning argument.
- This seems to beg the question, and may be a more awkward case than that in hand.
- I ought to know, as these philosophers’ views on the topic of personal identity are the focus of my research.
- Consciousness is a slippery topic, as there are various forms – and a great divide (it is said) between phenomenal consciousness and consciousness of self.
- Kazez notes that research indicates that a sense of smell “probably” arises at 20 weeks.
- Cautious in which direction? Or is it both? So, definitely not before 24 weeks, definitely not later than 34 weeks?
- My take on the matter – Kazez just says that it does rule them out.
- I think Baker “looks ahead” and retrofits her metaphysics to her religious beliefs.
- While this is true, it’s not as true as one might expect. Richard Swinburne & Dean Zimmerman are exceptions.
- For some others, see Mark C. Baker & Stewart Goetz, The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul, 2010 (Link)
Footnote 39: Footnote 40:
- Kazez doesn’t really refute Baker’s view, which is disappointing.
- I suspect Baker – while raising interesting questions about FPPs – of just cobbling together a view that agrees with her prior beliefs.
- By this, I don’t so much object to her constitution view as such. It’s her “rudimentary FPP” account that I find awkward. It’s a fudge to stop her position being seen as absurd (that we pop into existence when we develop a full-blown FPP). The FPP is either an essential property or it isn’t.
- Not that Baker is alone here. David Wiggins doesn’t – it seems to me – properly stick to his guns when he adds the rider that persons are members of “species whose members typically have” certain person-defining attributes.
- Personhood is either a property or an ontological category; we shouldn’t fudge things lest there be awkward moral dilemmas.
- We can still give the rights of persons to non-persons of certain categories if we wish. But it’s important that we understand what we are doing, as if we have to choose between saving a person or a non-person, we should choose the former.
- Kazez doesn’t say just how early Olson thinks we might begin to exist.
- Given that she’s willing to posit that we might have started at 4 days, with future fetal support structures as proper parts, there can’t be much difference between her views and Olson’s (alleged) “very early” view.
- Probably because the readership is supposed to include bovine mothers-to-be!
- She doesn’t mention it herself. Indeed, it must have been written later, and is an expansion of this passage, though much of the wording is identical, with helpful diagrams.
- I might note that miscarriages tend to occur because there is something wrong with the fetal development – though there are exceptions where there is injury to the mother, which should be classified as abortions.
- Non-abortions probably fall under the category of “dashed hopes”. Any child-to-be has probably already left the scene.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)