|Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity|
|Baker (Lynne Rudder)|
|Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 15:7–15, 2016|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Statistics||Books / Papers Citing this Paper||Notes Citing this Paper||Colour-Conventions||Disclaimer|
→ (1). Under what conditions is a person considered at time t the same person as a person considered at time t’?
This is the standard question of personal identity, and I’ll call it ‘the numerical-identity question1.’ I’ll follow Schechtman and call the second question ‘the characterization question’:
→ (2) Under what conditions are “actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on (hereafter abbreviated ‘characteristics’) to be attributed to a given [human being]?” (Schechtman 19962, 73)
The numeral-identity question concerns “logical relations of identity” and the characterization question concerns “identity in the sense of what is generally called, following Erikson, an ‘identity crisis’. (Schechtman 1996, 2) I think that self-narratives generally aim to answer the characterization question, and not the numerical-identity question.
Footnote 2: See "Schechtman (Marya) - The Constitution of Selves".
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
|© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Dec 2019.||Please address any comments on this page to email@example.com.||File output: |
Website Maintenance Dashboard
|Return to Top of this Page||Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page||Return to Theo Todman's Home Page|