Practical Realism as Metaphysics
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, 51(4):13–20, 2014.
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Introduction

  1. Mainstream analytic metaphysics is a priori metaphysics. It is hemmed in by basic assumptions that rest on no more than a priori intuitions.
  2. Jaegwon Kim’s (1989) arguments about causation1 are a paradigm example of sophisticated arguments with little or no justification from the world as we know it.
  3. And Peter van Inwagen’s (1990) arguments about material objects are motivated by a question that, I think, has no nontrivial answer: Under what conditions do some x’s compose an object y? The trivial answers are ‘Always’ and ‘Never’. Any other answer, including van Inwagen’s, seems to me to be arbitrary — and again based on a priori intuitions.


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