There Is No Simpliciter Simpliciter
Braddon-Mitchell (David) & Miller (Kristie)
Source: Philosophical Studies: Vol. 136, No. 2 (Nov., 2007), pp. 249-278
Paper - Abstract

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Authors’ Abstract

  1. This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter.
  2. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest.
  3. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family of second-order properties of the foundational property are relevant to property manifestation at different times.

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