Defending Contingentism in Metaphysics
Miller (Kristie)
Source: Dialectica, Vol. 63, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 23-49
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our world:
    → under what conditions composition occurs;
    → how objects persist through time;
    → whether properties are universal or tropes.
    It is near orthodoxy that whichever of these sorts of metaphysical claims is true is necessarily true.
  2. This paper looks at the debate between that orthodox view and a recently emerging view that claims like these are contingent, by focusing on the metaphysical debate between monists and pluralists about concrete particulars.
  3. This paper argues that we should be contingentists about monism and pluralism, and it defends contingentism against some necessitarian objections by offering an epistemology of contingent metaphysical claims.

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