'Personal identity' minus the persons
Miller (Kristie)
Source: Philosophical Studies: Vol. 166, Supplement 1 (December 2013), pp. S91-S109
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. This paper defends a version of strong conventionalism minus the ontological commitments of that view.
  2. It defends the claim that strictly speaking there are no persons1, whilst explicating how to make sense of talk that is about (or purportedly about) persons, by appealing to features in common to conventionalist accounts of personal identity.
  3. This view has the many benefits of conventionalist accounts in being flexible enough to deal with problem cases, whilst also avoiding the various worries associated with the existence of both persons and human animals2 occupying the same place at the same time to which conventionalist accounts are committed.

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