- There is a good deal of disagreement about composition.
- There is first order disagreement: there are radically different answers to the special composition question – the question of under what circumstances the xs compose a y.
- There is second-order disagreement: there are different answers to the question of whether first-order disagreement is real or merely semantic.
- Virtually all disputants with respect to both the first- and second-order issues agree that the answer or answers to the special composition question will take the form of a necessary truth or truths even though, as I will argue, such answers do not appear to be good candidates to be necessary truths.
- This paper provides an analysis of the concept of as it pertains to concrete objects, that fulfils two functions.
- First, it explicates the sense in which claims about composition are contingent and the sense in which they are necessary, and
- second, it provides a way of understanding when first-order disputes are substantial and when they are merely semantic.
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