The Existential Quantifier, Composition and Contingency
Miller (Kristie)
Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 73, No. 2 (September 2010), pp. 211-235
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. There is a good deal of disagreement about composition.
    1. There is first order disagreement: there are radically different answers to the special composition question – the question of under what circumstances the xs compose a y.
    2. There is second-order disagreement: there are different answers to the question of whether first-order disagreement is real or merely semantic.
  2. Virtually all disputants with respect to both the first- and second-order issues agree that the answer or answers to the special composition question will take the form of a necessary truth or truths even though, as I will argue, such answers do not appear to be good candidates to be necessary truths.
  3. This paper provides an analysis of the concept of as it pertains to concrete objects, that fulfils two functions.
    1. First, it explicates the sense in which claims about composition are contingent and the sense in which they are necessary, and
    2. second, it provides a way of understanding when first-order disputes are substantial and when they are merely semantic.

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