Vagueness, Persistence and Indeterminate Identity
Miller (Kristie)
Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 64, No. 2 (Mar., 2006), pp. 223-230
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. I argue that for those who follow Gareth Evans in finding indeterminacy of de re identity statements problematic, ontic vagueness within a three-dimensionalist metaphysics will raise some problems that are not faced by the four-dimensionalist.
  2. For the types of strategies used to avoid de re indeterminacy within the context of ontic vagueness at-at-time, that is, spatial vagueness, are problematic within a three dimensionalist framework when put to use within the context of ontic vagueness across-time, that is temporal vagueness.

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